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Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me. 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!1
This is the true nature of home—it is the place of Peace; 
the shelter, not only from all injury, but from all terror, 
doubt, and division.
 
–Emma Lazarus (1883) 
 
2
–Irish Proverb 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
–John Ruskin (1865) 
 
Bricks and mortar make a house, but the laughter of 
children makes a home. 
Vast numbers of American children suffer from homelessness.  
Homeless advocacy groups estimate that every year more than one 
million American children are homeless.3
 
 1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in EMMA LAZARUS, SELECTION FROM HER 
POETRY AND PROSE 40–41 (Morris U. Schappes, ed.) (1944).  This sonnet is 
inscribed on a plaque at the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, and is also engraved 
on the wall of the reception hall in the John F. Kennedy International Airport in 
New York City.  DAN VOGEL, EMMA LAZARUS, 157, 159 (1980). 
 2. JOHN RUSKIN, SESAME AND LILIES 73 (Gertrude Buck ed., Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1905). 
  The United States 
 3. THE NAT’L CTR. ON FAMILY HOMELESSNESS (“NCFH”), HOMELESS CHILDREN: 
AMERICA’S NEW OUTCASTS, 1, http://www.cudenver.edu/Academics/Colleges/ 
ArchitecturePlanning/discover/centers/CYE/Publications/Documents/outcasts.
pdf [hereinafter NCFH, AMERICA’S NEW OUTCASTS].  The NCFH explains that 
2
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government acknowledges similarly staggering numbers.  The 
United States Department of Education reported that the number 
of homeless children and youth (defined as pre-kindergarten 
through twelfth grade) increased from approximately 841,700 
children in 1997 to 930,200 children in the year 2000.4  Young 
children—those in preschool and elementary school—comprise 
the largest number of homeless American children.5  In the 2003–
2004 academic year, more than 600,000 schoolchildren in the 
United States were homeless.6  The United States Conference of 
Mayors reports that of the homeless population in the twenty-three 
cities it surveyed, households with children constituted 30% of 
those homeless in 2006 and 23% of those homeless in 2007.7
As shocking as these numbers are, they are probably 
conservative estimates.  Many of the states included in the 
Department of Education’s report to Congress capture only the 
number of homeless children living in shelters.
   
8  This tendency to 
focus on shelters to count the homeless often results in an 
underestimation of the total number of homeless people because it 
excludes people living in rural areas who may not have access to 
shelters, those living in vehicles9 or makeshift housing, those 
“doubling up” with family or friends, and those living in unstable 
housing arrangements who could soon find themselves homeless.10
To better grasp the scope of homelessness in the United 
States, some researchers have instead sought to discover how many 
   
 
although counting the exact number of homeless children is difficult, a consensus 
is emerging among researchers that the number is in excess of one million 
children.  Id. 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT TO CONGRESS: EDUCATION FOR HOMELESS 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH PROGRAM 9 (2000), http://www.ed.gov/programs/ 
homeless/rpt2000.doc [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS 2000]. 
 5. Id. at 5. 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH PROGRAM 
19 (2006), http://www.ed.gov/programs/homeless/rpt2006.doc. 
 7. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A 
STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES: A 23-CITY 
SURVEY 18 (2007), http://usmayors.org/HHSurvey2007/hhsurvey07.pdf. 
 8. REPORT TO CONGRESS 2000, supra note 4, at 6. 
 9. Ian Urbina, Keeping It Secret as the Family Car Becomes a Home, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2006, at 1–11 (reporting increase of “mobile homelessness” as housing 
costs rise). 
 10. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING 7 (2004), 
http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/HomelessnessintheUSandRightstoHousing.
pdf [hereinafter NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING]. 
3
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people have experienced homelessness.11  One study estimates that 
13.5 million adult residents of the United States have been 
homeless at some time, and 5.7 million had been homeless in the 
five years prior to being surveyed.12  When “doubling up” is 
included in the definition of homelessness, the numbers jump to 
26 million and 8.5 million respectively.13
The current economic crisis—and its attendant skyrocketing 
foreclosure rates—has resulted in many more Americans 
experiencing homelessness.  A survey of local and state homeless 
coalitions revealed that almost 61% reported an increase in 
homelessness since the start of the foreclosure crisis in 2007.
 
14  
Many cities, including Reno, Nevada and Seattle, Washington, are 
reporting increases in homeless encampments or “tent cities” as a 
result of the foreclosure crisis.15
[L]acks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime 
residence . . . and has a primary nighttime residence that 
is – (A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter 
designed to provide temporary living accommodations . . . 
; (B) an institution that provides a temporary residence 
for individuals intended to be institutionalized; or (C) a 
public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily 
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human 
beings.
 
In the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, Congress 
stated that a person is considered to be homeless when she or he: 
16
(i) children and youths who are sharing the housing of 
other persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, 
 
Congress expanded upon this definition in the revised 
McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance Improvements Act 
of 2001, stating that the term “homeless” includes: 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Bruce G. Link et al., Lifetime and Five-Year Prevalence of Homelessness in the 
United States, 84 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1907, 1910 (1994). 
 13. Id. 
 14. NAT’L  COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS: THE 
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 5 (2008), 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/housing/foreclosure_report.pdf. 
 15. Evelyn Nieves, Coast to Coast, Tent Cities Rising, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 
19, 2008, available at http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20080919_ 
Coast_to_coast__tent_cities_rising.html. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2000).  The McKinney-Vento Education for 
Homeless Children and Youth Act grew out of the McKinney Homeless Assistance 
Act (Public Law 100-77) that became law in 1987 and was revised and reauthorized 
in 2001 as part of the No Child Left Behind Act. 
4
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or a similar reason; are living in motels, hotels, trailer 
parks, or camping grounds due to the lack of alternative 
adequate accommodations; are living in emergency or 
transitional shelters; are abandoned in hospitals;              
or are awaiting foster care placement; 
 
(ii) children and youths who have a primary nighttime 
residence that is a public or private place not designed for 
or ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation 
for human beings . . . ; 
 
(iii) children and youths who are living in cars, parks, 
public spaces, abandoned buildings, substandard housing, 
bus or train stations, or similar settings; and 
 
(iv) migratory children . . . who qualify as homeless for the 
purposes of this part because the children are living in 
circumstances described in clauses (i) through (iii).17
What a homeless person “looks like” in our society is quite 
different than a few decades ago.  The predominance of white men 
among the homeless has decreased and America’s homeless are 
now “diverse by employment status, age, gender, family situation, 
ethnicity, addiction and mental health.”
 
18  In 2003, the United 
States Conference of Mayors estimated that 41% of America’s 
homeless population were single men, 40% were families with 
children, 14% were single women, and 5% were unaccompanied 
minors.19  Violence is both a contributing and ongoing factor in the 
lives of many homeless women and their children.20
 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2) (2002); see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION FOR 
HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH, TITLE VII-B OF THE MCKINNEY-VENTO HOMELESS 
ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED BY THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 2001, NON-
REGULATORY GUIDANCE 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
programs/homeless/guidance.pdf (interpreting the McKinney-Vento Homeless 
Education Assistance Improvements Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 11431, et seq.). 
 
 18. NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 10, at 8. 
 19. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A 
STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES: A 25-CITY 
SURVEY ii (2003). 
 20. See Symposium, A Leadership Summit: The Link Between Violence and Poverty 
in the Lives of Women and Their Children, 3 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 5 (1995); 
THE Nat’l Ctr. on Family Homelessness, Violence in the Lives of Homeless Women, 
available at http://www.councilofcollaboratives.org/files/fact_violence.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2009) (reporting that 92% of homeless mothers surveyed had 
“experienced severe physical and/or sexual assault at some point in the lives,” and 
that 60% had been abused by age twelve); Nat’l Coal. for the Homeless (NCH), 
5
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The negative impacts of homelessness are particularly severe 
for children and youth, both physically and developmentally.  
Homeless children get sick more frequently than children in 
middle-class families, and have “higher rates of asthma, ear 
infections, stomach problems, and speech problems.”21  Homeless 
children also go hungry twice as often as other children and are 
more likely to have mental health problems than housed children, 
frequently experiencing anxiety, depression, and emotional 
withdrawal.22  According to the National Center on Family 
Homelessness, 74% of homeless children “worry they will have no 
place to live”; 58% “worry they will have no place to sleep”; and 
87% “worry that something bad will happen to their family.”23
The constant stresses, physical ailments, and traumatic 
experiences that result from being homeless have deep effects on 
the cognitive and emotional development of homeless children.
 
24  
Children who are homeless experience significant developmental 
and education challenges.  School-age homeless children often 
change schools, are frequently absent, and as a result have higher 
rates of grade repetition compared with their non-homeless 
classmates.25  They also face barriers to enrolling and attending 
school, including transportation problems, difficulties providing 
the necessary paperwork for enrollment such as medical 
documentation and prior school records, and inadequate clothing 
and school supplies.26
 
NCH Fact Sheet #12 – Homeless Families with Children (June 2008), 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/families.html [hereinafter 
NCH, Homeless Families with Children] (reporting that 22% of homeless parents 
surveyed “said they had left their last place of residence because of domestic 
violence,” and that 50% of cities surveyed “identified domestic violence as a 
primary cause of homelessness”). 
  Confronted with these alarming realities of 
the high rates of child homelessness, Congress passed an amended 
version of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance 
Improvements Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11434(a), as part of the No Child 
 21. NCH, Homeless Families with Children, supra note 20. 
 22. Id. 
 23. NCFH, AMERICA’S NEW OUTCASTS, supra note 3, at 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. NCH, Homeless Families with Children, supra note 20; David H. Rubin et al., 
Cognitive and Academic Functioning of Homeless Children Compared with Housed 
Children, 97(3) PEDIATRICS 289, 293 (1996) (finding no difference in cognitive 
functioning between homeless and housed children but finding that homeless 
children performed significantly worse than housed children in tests of academic 
performance). 
6
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Left Behind Act of 2001.  The revised Act seeks to remove these 
barriers by placing new requirements on local educational agencies 
to provide transportation,27 and allows school districts to enroll 
children immediately even if they lack the required documents.28  
The Act also prohibits states that receive funds under the Act from 
maintaining segregated schools designated especially for homeless 
children.29
In passing the revised Homeless Education Assistance Act, 
Congress made a very public commitment to the educational rights 
of homeless children.  The Act was not accompanied by additional 
legislation to address the homeless aspect of these children’s lives but 
in fact came at a time when the housing needs of so many 
Americans were going unmet by federal funding.
   
30
As these statistics demonstrate, our society is failing to ensure 
the basic needs of its most vulnerable members.  Federal funding 
for low-income housing has been drastically reduced over the past 
several decades.
  These 
circumstances suggest that policymakers are unwilling to address 
the underlying issues that result in educational inequities.  If we 
take the educational rights of children seriously, we are compelled 
to confront child homelessness. 
31  The National Law Center on Homelessness & 
Poverty reports that appropriations for housing totaled $36.78 
billion for fiscal year 2004, compared to the fiscal year 1976 budget 
of $83.6 billion in constant dollars.32
 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(1)(J)(iii) (2002). 
 28. Id. § 11432(g)(3)(C)(i). 
 29. Id. § 11432(e)(3)(A) (citations omitted).  The 2001 Act also contains a 
grandfather clause that allows separate schools that were operational in the fiscal 
year 2000, in a covered county, to be eligible to receive funds.  See id. § 
11432(e)(3)(B).  For an argument that separate schools provide essential services 
to homeless children and that the 2001 Act was wrong to prohibit these schools, see 
Andrea B. Berkowitz, Homeless Children Dream of College Too: The Struggle to Provide 
America’s Homeless Youth with a Viable Education, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 515, 517 (2002) 
(arguing that these schools are “separate but equal” and that “[w]ithout these 
schools, homeless children will not be able to attend school at all, and will thus be 
deprived of their constitutional right to a free and appropriate education.”). 
 30. See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 31. “Federal subsidies for homeownership among middle- and upper-income 
households via homeownership-related tax deductions greatly exceed those for 
public and subsidized housing, and the funding gap is widening.”  NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUS. COAL. ET AL., THE CRISIS IN AMERICA’S HOUSING: CONFRONTING MYTHS 
AND PROMOTING A BALANCED HOUSING POLICY 1, 3 (2005), 
http://nlihc.org/doc/housingmyths.pdf. 
  This has had dramatic results, 
much to the detriment of those needing subsidized housing.  More 
 32. NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 10, at v. 
7
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than 435,362 additional low-income units were built or subsidized 
in fiscal year 1976.33  By fiscal year 1996, this number had dropped 
to 8,493 units, increasing to 135,000 units in fiscal year 2000.34  
Presently “[o]nly 34% of the nation’s 9.9 million most needy renter 
households—those in the bottom fifth of the income distribution—
receive housing assistance.”35
Millions of people in the United States are living on the brink 
of homelessness, deeply vulnerable to finding themselves without a 
home.  According to the United States government, the shortage of 
supportive housing and permanent affordable housing has resulted 
in 4.89% of American families or 5.18 million households having 
“worst case housing needs,” meaning that they are very low-income 
households that spend more than half of their income on housing 
or live in substandard housing.
 
36  More than one-third of these 
“worst case housing needs” households—numbering 1.85 million—
are families with children.37  Because of these significant unmet 
housing needs, the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions named (and shamed) the United States as one of the 
recipients of the 2004 Housing Rights Violators of the Year 
“Award.”38
The United States lags behind other wealthy nations in terms 
of the amount of resources dedicated to caring for the needs of its 
poor people.  In a recent comparison with the nineteen other 
wealthy, industrialized nations that belong to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the United 
States is a noticeable outlier.  At the same time that the United 
States ranks second highest in per capita income,
 
39
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at iii. 
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR HOUSING 1, 11 (2005), 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/AffHsgNeedsRpt2003.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 2, 19. 
 38. Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Housing Rights 
Awards 2004, http://www.cohre.org/view_page.php?page_id=247 (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2009) (arguing that the United States systematically violates the right to 
housing by allowing such a high homelessness rate, criminalizing homelessness, 
and destroying thousands of homes in Iraq with “indiscriminate” bombing). 
 it ranks last in 
 39. Economic Policy Institute, International Comparisons: How Does the United 
States Stack Up Against Its Global Peers?, in THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 
2008/2009 357, 384–85 (2008), available at http://www.stateofworkingamerica. 
org/swa08-ch08-international.pdf.  The United States was compared with 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
8
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social expenditures as a proportion of gross domestic product and 
has the highest rates of poverty by a variety of measures.40  The 
United States has the highest overall poverty rate (17.0%), the 
highest child poverty rate (21.9%), and the highest elderly poverty 
rate (24.7%).41
In this article, I suggest that housing needs and homelessness 
should be reframed
 
42 as a rights issue.  More specifically, I argue for 
a rights-based approach to reducing child homelessness.  
International human rights law is perhaps the single richest source 
of law that protects the right to housing.43  Within human rights 
law, the right to shelter is one of the many rights often grouped 
within the category or family of rights known as “economic and 
social rights.”44
I am not the first commentator to argue for a right to shelter 
in the United States,
  I therefore advance a rights-based approach that is 
informed by the human rights concepts of basic economic and 
social rights, and more specifically, the right to housing as 
developed within human rights law.  International and comparative 
law materials will prove to be especially helpful for those looking to 
cultivate a right to housing in the United States.  I encourage 
legislators, advocates, and judges to draw from international 
human rights materials as well as the decisions of constitutional 
courts in other countries as persuasive authority when giving 
substance to this right.   
45
 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  Id. 
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. Id. at 1–2. 
 42. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND 
FRAME THE DEBATE—THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004) (encouraging 
progressives to regain semantic equity with conservatives by reframing their 
arguments to better resonate with the electorate). 
 nor am I the first to advocate for the 
 43. This article uses the phrases “right to shelter” and “right to housing” 
interchangeably.  See NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 10, at 24 
(explaining that several international declarations use the term “shelter” and 
“housing” interchangeably).  For a complete list of the legal sources of the right to 
housing under international human rights law, see Office of the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, The Human Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet No. 
21, at Appendix I, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Publications/FactSheet21en.pdf. 
 44. This article uses several terms synonymously with “economic and social 
rights,” including “welfare rights,” “social welfare rights,” and “subsistence rights.” 
 45. Several United States-based NGOs, including the National Law Center on 
Homelessness & Poverty and the Center for Economic and Social Rights, advocate 
for a right to housing in the United States based upon human rights principles.  
9
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recognition of economic and social rights in the domestic 
context.46  Over the past several decades, many American legal 
scholars have advocated for greater legal protections and 
entitlements for the poor,47 with some explicitly calling for the 
recognition of social welfare rights in the United States.48
 
See NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 
  By 
10; Ctr. for Econ. and Social 
Rights (“CESR”), About This Right? (describing basic components of the right to 
housing), available at http://cesr.org/article.php?id=131; see also Adam S. Cohen, 
Symposium, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the 
Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615, 618–19 (1989) (arguing that state courts should 
take a “different, and more receptive, approach to the question of a right to 
shelter” than federal courts have); Dennis D. Hirsch, Making Shelter Work: Placing 
Conditions on an Employable Person’s Right to Shelter, 100 YALE L.J. 491 (1990); Frank 
I. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 207 (1970); Frank I. Michelman, The Right to Housing, in THE RIGHTS 
OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE – WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 43 (Norman Dorsen, ed.) 
(1970).  But see Martha R. Burt, Chronic Homelessness: Emergence of a Public Policy, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267 (2003) (arguing for more attention to be paid to chronic 
homelessness without employing a rights-based perspective). 
 46. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Symposium, Just Education: An Essay for Frank 
Michelman, 39 TULSA L. REV. 547, 556 (2004) (stating that “perhaps no issue so 
joins political and civil rights with social and economic rights so clearly as does 
education.”); Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International 
Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New Strategy,” 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 88 (1992) 
(proposing that the United States ratify the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and delegate its implementation to the 
states). 
 47. See Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89 (2002); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our 
Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987).  Other 
prominent scholars have accepted the notion of positive welfare rights as 
consistent with their theories of rights and justice.  See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-
IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 92 (2003) (advancing a theory of positive and relational rights 
that includes “welfare rights and rights to work”) [hereinafter WEST, RE-IMAGINING 
JUSTICE]. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 35 (1994) (arguing that an abolitionist understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides “at least some support for the claim that the 
equal protection clause guarantees minimal welfare rights, not only to shelter, 
food, and clothing, but also to a livable minimum income or job”); RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 367 (1978) (stating that a right to a minimum 
level of welfare understood as “the claim that it is wrong for government to 
maintain an economic system under which certain individuals or families or 
groups fall below minimum welfare even if that economic system produces higher 
average utility (greater overall collective welfare) than any other system” is not 
excluded by his account of rights). 
 48.  Frank Michelman has been one of the most longstanding proponents of 
welfare rights within the American legal academy, advocating a rights-based 
approach to economic and social justice for nearly four decades.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, Michelman argued that equal protection under the United States 
Constitution requires the states to guarantee a minimal level of welfare to its 
10
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focusing on a right to shelter for children, however, this article 
makes a new contribution to an ongoing discussion of how 
economic and social rights concepts could be usefully employed in 
the United States.  This article is also timely because of the 
increasing tendency of United States-based lawyers and advocates 
to utilize human rights principles in their domestic advocacy and 
activism.49  A report released by the Ford Foundation highlights the 
work of thirteen domestic organizations that are using traditional 
human rights tools to reduce poverty, promote workers’ rights and 
environmental justice, abolish the death penalty, and end 
discrimination.50
The staggering statistics about homeless children demonstrate 
that a right to shelter for all American children remains largely 
unfulfilled.  Constructing and articulating the idea of a 
fundamental human right to shelter for all children is an important 
advancement in the effort to eliminate child homelessness.  
Human rights are a powerful moral language, and one that 
   
 
inhabitants.  See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9, 13 (1969) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court should address deprivation suffered by the poor); Frank I. Michelman, In 
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawl’s Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. 
L. REV. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979).  More recently, Michelman has been advancing a 
comparative constitutional law approach to social rights.  See Frank I. Michelman, 
The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 
(2003); Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Reason, 14 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 499 (1998).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium, Under the Bridges of 
Paris: Economic Liberties Should Not Be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 33 (2003) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court “should interpret the Constitution as creating a 
right to minimum entitlements for all Americans to the necessities of life: food, 
shelter, and medical care”); Frank E.L. Deale, The Unhappy History of Economic 
Rights in the United States and Prospects for Their Creation and Renewal, 43 HOW. L.J. 
281 (2000); William E. Forbath, Symposium, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, 
Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001); William E. Forbath, 
Symposium, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001). 
 49. See, e.g., NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 10 (arguing that 
the scope of homelessness and substandard housing in the United States violates 
the right to housing under international law, and suggesting ways of strengthening 
the right to housing domestically); The Ctr. for Econ. and Social Rights (“CESR”), 
About Us, http://www.cesr.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (describing 
CESR’s mission as advocating for social justice using human rights tools and 
strategies). 
 50. Press Release, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Report Examines 
Human Rights Work in the United States (Feb. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.fordfound.org/newsroom/humanrights/86.  The full report is 
available at the Foundation’s website at http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/ 
impact/close_to_home.pdf. 
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resonates favorably with most Americans.  In a 1997 Hart Research 
poll, 76% of respondents said that universal human rights are 
intrinsic, rather than granted by governments.51
Conceiving of housing as a right transforms a request for the 
exercise of discretion into a demand for the satisfaction of an 
entitlement.  A right to housing provides children who attempt to 
obtain shelter or keep their existing home with a “political 
trump.”
  My hope is that 
reframing homelessness as a rights-based issue will change the 
climate around the issue in positive ways, raising the profile and 
spurring greater legislative attention to the problem.  Similarly, 
encouraging human rights education and grassroots action that 
teaches homeless people and their advocates about the right to 
housing under international law will enable them to make stronger 
claims for housing assistance in their lobbying and activist efforts. 
52  Applying Ronald Dworkin’s understanding of a right to 
the issue of shelter for children suggests that such a right would 
mean that a collective goal (e.g., lowering taxes) is not a sufficient 
justification for denying children a right to shelter or imposing 
some loss or injury upon them.53  In his classic essay on American 
rights consciousness, Hendrik Hartog suggests two ways of 
describing the demand that lies behind the assertion of a claimed 
right in addition to the “right as a trump.”54  A right is “a duty on a 
public authority to undo—to destroy—the structures that maintain 
hierarchy and oppression.”55
 
 51. World Public Opinion, Human Rights in General, available at 
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/human_rights/HRinGen. 
cfm.  Respondents were asked whether they believed that every person has basic 
rights that are common to all human beings, regardless of whether their 
government recognizes those rights or not; or whether they believed that rights 
are given to an individual by his or her government.  Id.  Seventy-six percent said 
that every person has basic rights, 17% said rights are given by the government, 
4% said some of both, and 3% said they were not sure.  Id.  Few of the Americans 
surveyed (8%), however, knew about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”).  Id.  The complete data from the 1997 Hart survey can be found at the 
website of the Human Rights Resource Center at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/edumat/adultsur.htm. 
 52. Dworkin, supra note 47, at xi.  See also Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of 
Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74(3) J. AMER. HIST. 1013, 1020 
(1987) (stating that the most familiar characterization of a right is “as a ‘trump,’ a 
claim that, once established, triumphs over competing values and claims”). 
 53. Dworkin, supra note 47, at xi. 
 54. Hartog, supra note 52, at 1020. 
 55. Id.  Although Hartog is speaking specifically about federal constitutional 
rights consciousness, his insights about the meanings of rights claims are 
generalizable to rights claims in the United States. 
  Finally, a right is “a duty on public 
12
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authority to reconstruct itself or its relations to its citizens, or lose 
legitimacy.”56  The first “right as a ‘trump’” claim says, “Mine!”57  
The second claim says, “Not theirs!”58  The third claim says, “Do 
what is necessary, or I will never again trust you!”59
In advocating for the development of a right to shelter for 
children, I am aiming to cultivate such a right both culturally and 
legally.  By developing the right culturally, I mean developing a 
philosophical and moral understanding of fundamental rights that 
addresses children’s needs for adequate and stable shelter.  To 
borrow a term from Hartog, I am arguing that American “rights 
consciousness” should include a child’s right to shelter.
  A child’s claim 
that she has a fundamental right to shelter could encompass all 
three aspects of rights claims. 
60  While 
support for human rights in the United States appears to be high, 
specific knowledge about human rights law is low,61 and thus 
human rights education62
By developing a child’s right to shelter legally, I mean building 
the capacity of our domestic legal system, both under state and 
federal law, to recognize and promote children’s housing needs 
through positive law.  As I discuss in more detail in Part V, I believe 
that state constitutional law provides a uniquely fertile ground for 
the substantive development of this right.  Over the long term, 
advocates can also seek the recognition of a substantive right to 
housing under federal law, which would require revisiting Lindsey v. 
Normet.
 will be an essential aspect of entrenching 
a child’s right to shelter and other basic human rights within a 
domestic culture of rights. 
63
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See generally id. at 1019. 
 61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 62. Many NGOs are working on human rights education and most have 
detailed websites that provide free access to materials for use in human rights 
education.  See, e.g., The Global Human Rights Education Network, 
http://www.hrea.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2009); The Human Rights Resource 
Center, http://www.hrusa.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2009); The International 
Network for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, http://www.escr-net.org (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2009); The People’s Movement for Human Rights Learning, 
http://www.pdhre.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
  In the short term, however, it appears that invoking 
 63. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).  In Lindsey v. Normet, the Court upheld an Oregon 
eviction statute requiring early trial and limiting the litigable issues in an eviction 
trial against due process and equal protection challenges.  Id.  Justice White, 
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federal procedural and statutory rights is a far more realistic 
endeavor.  Developing this right legally might also include 
promoting the passage of new federal and state legislation that 
recognizes and provides the right of all children to adequate 
housing.  United States ratification of the remaining human rights 
treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),64 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”),65 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”)66
 
writing for the majority, stated: 
  We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing.  But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for 
every social and economic ill.  We are unable to perceive in that 
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a 
particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy 
the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the 
payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant 
agreement.  Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are 
legislative, not judicial, functions.  Nor should we forget that the 
Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property or 
the income therefrom. 
Id. at 74. 
 64. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force Jan. 
3, 1976, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 65. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e1cedaw.htm 
[hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 66. United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm [hereinafter CRC]. 
 might be another positive outcome of culturally and 
legally developing human rights in the United States. 
This article is organized in the following manner.  In Part II, I 
clear the theoretical ground for the cultivation of a child’s right to 
shelter.  I consider and rebut arguments that economic and social 
rights like the right to shelter are theoretically distinct from civil 
and political rights and therefore cannot and should not function 
in the same way in domestic and international legal systems as do 
civil and political rights.  I argue that economic and social rights 
are justiciable rights, that they can (and should) contain both 
positive and negative rights dimensions, and that they are of the 
same generation as civil and political rights in the realm of 
international human rights law. 
14
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Both American legal history and the development of 
international law norms provide rich foundations from which a 
contemporary domestic social rights movement could emerge.  In 
Part III, I briefly review some of the moments in American political 
history where welfare rights movements gained considerable 
momentum, in order to demonstrate that a revitalized American 
welfare rights movement in the twenty-first century would not be 
historically anomalous.  In Part IV, I briefly survey the development 
of the international human rights movement, exploring sources of 
international human rights law that provide protection for a 
human right to housing and other basic social rights that can be 
employed in a domestic context in the development of a right to 
shelter for children.  Finally, in Part V, I suggest several ways that a 
right to shelter, informed by these international human rights 
norms, could both inspire new legal recognitions of and 
protections for a child’s right to shelter within the United States. 
My primary focus in Part V is the potential to strengthen the 
concept of a child’s right to shelter under state constitutional law.  
I argue that state constitutional law is a promising avenue through 
which to develop the concept of a child’s right to shelter for a 
number of reasons.  First, it would allow for greater flexibility and 
contextualization than creating a federal substantive right to 
shelter.  Second, many state constitutions provide a helpful 
foundation for a right to housing because they already contain 
provisions that address social welfare issues.  For example, Article 
17 of the New York Constitution, which mandates that “[t]he aid, 
care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be 
provided by the state,” has been interpreted to create a right to 
emergency shelter for the homeless.67
 
 
  To conclude, I draw from 
the lessons in Parts II through V to suggest several strategies for 
working towards the recognition of a child’s right to housing in the 
United States. 
 
 67. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII; see Wilkins v. Perales, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1985). 
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II. CREATING SPACE FOR A RIGHT TO SHELTER: 
RETHINKING RIGHTS NORMS 
How can one argue that the right to vote is more 
important than the right to a roof over one’s head?  And 
yet, without the right to vote, and all that entails in terms 
of democratic choice, how will people ever secure the 
policies which will provide roofs over their heads?68
A. Confronting Rights Norms 
 
–Mary Robinson (1998) 
 
Before moving to an analysis of international human rights law 
as a foundation for a child’s right to shelter in the United States, I 
must first clear some doctrinal ground for the cultivation of a 
child’s right to housing.  This requires rebutting several normative 
assumptions about distinctions that can or should be drawn 
between political and civil rights on the one hand, and economic 
and social rights on the other, which is my task in the first half of 
this section.  In place of these rejected distinctions, I seek to 
reconstruct notions of rights by looking to recent developments in 
understandings of citizenship and how this has impacted the 
maturity of domestic bills of rights and the unfolding of 
international human rights law.  In the second half of this section, I 
discuss the evolving notions of citizenship as reflected in domestic 
constitutions, which in the last century have widely protected 
positive rights, including basic economic and social rights.  Finally, 
I conclude this section with an analysis of the principle of the 
interdependence of basic human rights—civil, political, economic, 
and social—as affirmed by international human rights law. 
One of the major arguments that proponents of a rights-based 
approach to poverty issues are likely to encounter is that economic 
and social rights like the right to shelter are theoretically distinct 
from civil and political rights.  These allegedly intrinsic differences 
between different kinds of rights mean that it is inappropriate and 
normatively wrong to promote or protect economic and social 
rights through the same means and institutions through which civil 
 
 68. Mary Robinson, Then-U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Belfast 
(Dec. 1998), excerpt available at Northern Ireland Human Rights Consortium, 
Frequently Asked Questions, Question 14, http://www.billofrightsni.org/faq. 
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and political rights are protected.69
An initial response to such essentialized claims about 
categories of rights is that understandings of rights are not fixed, 
but fluid and historically contingent.
 
70  This constitutional moment 
is not the only one in which legal thinkers and policymakers 
believed in drawing strong distinctions between different kinds of 
rights, but the distinctions have shifted over time.  Mark Tushnet 
explains that after the Civil War, when the Reconstruction 
amendments were being drafted, scholars believed that the 
distinctions among civil, political, and social rights “were 
immutable and almost inherent in the nature of society.”71  Despite 
these strong convictions, what these different categories of rights 
refer to has evolved significantly, undermining the claims of 
immutability.  For example, in the Reconstruction era, civil rights 
and political rights were seen to be distinct, whereas most of what 
was then considered to be political rights now fall under our 
modern definition of civil rights.72  Tushnet argues that from the 
outset, however, these Reconstruction-era distinctions were 
unstable and difficult to sustain.73
One distinction often made is that, as opposed to civil and 
 
 
 69. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the 
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695 (1979); Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive 
Rights, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 857, 866–67 (2001) (proposing that negative rights are 
theoretically distinguishable from positive rights because even if there was no 
government in existence, negative rights would be “automatically fulfilled”); Cass 
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights Don’t Belong in the 
New Constitutions of Post-Communist Europe, 2 E. EUROPEAN CONST. L. REV. 35 (1993) 
(cautioning against the inclusion of constitutionally protected social and 
economic rights in the new constitutions of former Soviet-bloc countries) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Against Positive Rights].  But see Chisanga Puta-Chekwe & 
Nora Flood, From Division to Integration: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Basic 
Human Rights, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 39 
(Isfahan Merali & Valerie Oosterveld, eds.) (2001) (refuting the argument that 
economic and social rights are fundamentally different from civil and political 
rights). 
 70. See Hartog, supra note 5252, at 1034 (stating that the meanings of 
American constitutional rights “have changed dramatically and frequently over 
time”). 
 71. Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (1992) (arguing that contemporary 
distinctions between civil and social rights are no less contingent than those drawn 
in the Reconstruction era) [hereinafter Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights].  
See id. for an elaboration of the Reconstruction-era understandings of political, 
civil, and social rights. 
 72. Id. at 1208–10. 
 73. Id. at 1209–10. 
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political rights, economic and social rights should not be 
justiciable.74  A second distinction is framed in substantive terms 
based upon the nature of state action involved, arguing that civil 
and political rights are “negative rights” whereas economic and 
social rights are “positive rights.”75  This distinction is often made 
in discussions about how to protect economic and social rights 
within domestic legal systems,76 and thus is interconnected to the 
justiciability debate.  A third distinction is usually made within the 
human rights discourse and is framed in temporal terms.  Civil and 
political rights are categorized as “first generation rights” while 
economic and social rights are called “second generation rights.”77
Like the distinctions existing at the time of the Reconstruction 
amendments, these contemporary distinctions purport to 
“captur[e] something essential about the social and legal order.”
  
These theoretical distinctions, which too often go unchallenged 
even within progressive circles, often result in the marginalization 
of economic and social rights from political and legal discourse.  
78  
And like the earlier distinctions Tushnet describes, the 
contemporary ones ultimately prove to be unstable.79
1. The Justiciability Debate 
  None of 
these distinctions provide a satisfactory means of classification 
because all three convey misleading and overly simplistic notions of 
these basic human rights. 
The primary arguments made against the justiciability of 
economic and social rights are that judges lack both the legitimacy 
and the competence needed to adjudicate issues relating to 
economic and social policy.80
 
 74. See Bork, supra note 69; Cross, supra note 69; Dennis M. Davis, The Case 
Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive 
Principles, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 475 (1992); Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 
supra note 69. 
 75. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 69. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Karel Vasak, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to 
Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER 
30:11, Nov. 1977 at 28, 29. 
 78. Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights, supra note 71, at 1219. 
 79. Id. at 1210–11 (claiming that “distinctions among rights have always been 
unstable in fact, though participants in any particular legal culture tend to believe 
that their culture’s definitions of the categories are embedded in the nature of 
society.”). 
  The former is usually framed as a 
 80. See Bork, supra note 69; Cross, supra note 69; Davis, supra note 74; 
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separation of powers argument—that judges speaking on issues of 
economic and social policy would be inherently legislative and 
therefore beyond the legitimate bounds of their judicial duties. 
The legitimacy objection claims that judicial intervention in 
issues of policymaking and budgetary decisions would inevitably 
entail a breach of the separation of powers doctrine.81  According 
to this interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, social 
and budgetary policy should be in the exclusive domain of the 
legislature, which is directly accountable to the electorate.82
Sandra Liebenberg argues that the above “legitimacy” 
arguments assume a rigid, formalist concept of the separation of 
powers doctrine.
  
Justiciable economic and social rights would grant the courts the 
power to order the state to take extensive positive action and make 
resource commitments, thus challenging the supremacy of the 
legislature in the realm of budgetary and social policy.  Also, given 
that judges are not elected and are often unaccountable to the 
public, it raises concerns about the democratic legitimacy of such a 
system. 
83
The legitimacy argument also overlooks the fact that courts 
frequently make decisions within areas of law that impact budgetary 
and economic policy.  In the United States, courts are seen to be 
  The importance of a court’s role in considering 
the constitutionality of legislative decisions relating to civil and 
political rights has long been appreciated.  This need for 
protection against the tyranny of the majority is just as essential in 
relation to economic and social rights as any other area.  There is a 
parallel need to have a constitutional check over legislation or 
executive action relating to economic and social issues.  Arguments 
against the entrenchment of economic and social rights tend to 
assume a system of benevolent majority rule in which the 
legislature always considers the basic human rights of minority 
groups and marginalized constituencies when making budgetary 
decisions.  Unfortunately this is rarely the case, as most societies 
have minority groups that have faced direct and indirect 
discrimination at the hands of the majority. 
 
Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 69. 
 81. Sandra Liebenberg, The Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Domestic 
Legal Systems, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 55, 58 
(Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas, eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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competent to adjudicate tax issues, bankruptcy issues, campaign 
financing issues, and even issues relating to the adequacy of 
educational funding.  In the 1996 case of the Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the South African 
Constitutional Court also disputed the idea that only economic and 
social rights interact with budgetary matters.84
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may 
result in courts making orders which have direct 
implications for budgetary matters.  However, even when 
a court enforces civil and political rights such as equality, 
freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it 
makes will often have such implications.  A court may 
require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state 
benefits to a class of people who formerly were not 
beneficiaries of such benefits.  In our view it cannot be 
said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill 
of rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different 
from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of 
rights that it results in a breach of the separation of 
powers.
  The court held that 
economic and social rights should be justiciable, stating: 
85
Although early on in its jurisprudential development, the 
South African Constitution of 1996 presents a helpful case study for 
understanding the possibilities for justiciable economic and social 
rights.
 
86  The economic and social rights included in South Africa’s 
Constitution can be categorized into three main types.  The first 
category (sections 28(1), 29(1), and 35(2)) entrenches a set of 
basic rights that consists of children’s economic and social rights, 
everyone’s right to a basic education, and the economic and social 
rights of detained persons.87  The state obligations are highest in 
relation to this first category of rights and are not subject to 
“progressive realization” or resource constraints.88
 
 84. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) 
SA 744 (CC), at 49 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ 
ZACC/1996/26.html. 
 85. Id. at 49–50. 
 86. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/ 
constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf. 
 87. Id. §§ 28(1), 29(1), 35(2). 
 88. Id. 
  The second 
category of constitutional economic and social rights (sections 
26(1) and 27(1)) establishes the right of everyone to have access to 
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adequate housing, health care, food, water, and social security.89  
The state obligation in relation to these rights is less absolute, but 
establishes that the state must take “reasonable legislative and other 
measures” within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realization of these rights.90  The third category of constitutional 
economic and social rights (sections 26(3) and 27(3)) imposes 
certain prohibitions on state action, as well as the action of other 
private parties, to prevent actions that have a devastating effect on 
people’s economic and social wellbeing, such as unfair and 
arbitrary evictions or refusal of emergency medical treatment.91  In 
addition to these three categories, the South African Constitution 
also includes rights relating to labor, the environment, land, and 
culture.92
The Constitution of Finland, revised in 1999 and entered into 
force in 2000, presents another possible model for entrenching 
economic and social rights.
 
93  Section 19 of the “Basic Rights and 
Liberties” portion of the Constitution guarantees a right to social 
security and opens with, “[t]hose who cannot obtain the means 
necessary for a life of dignity have the right to receive indispensable 
subsistence and care.”94  In addition to providing a general 
constitutional right to social security, section 19 also includes 
specific references to other basic economic and social rights, such 
as the right to housing and the right to health, thereby creating 
some positive state obligations in relation to these component 
rights.95
If those amending a constitution are unwilling to entrench 
judicially enforceable social and economic rights, there are other 
ways of including economic and social rights within a constitution.  
One such option is to include economic and social rights within a 
  This approach creates flexibility for both legislators and 
the judiciary to decide to what extent and what level of specificity 
they will create legally enforceable economic and social rights over 
time.  The approach, however, immediately codifies the underlying 
basic principle that economic and social rights must be attended to 
within domestic law. 
 
 89. Id. §§ 26(1), 27(1). 
 90. Id. §§ 26(2), 27(2). 
 91. Id. §§ 26(3), 27(3). 
 92. Id. §§ 22–25, 30. 
 93. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] (Fin.), available at 
http://www.om.fi/en/Etusivu/Perussaannoksia/Perustuslaki. 
 94. Id. § 19. 
 95. Id. 
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state’s constitution in the form of “Directive Principles of State 
Policy,” as is the case with the constitutions of India,96 the Republic 
of Ireland,97 Nigeria,98 and Namibia.99  “Directive Principles” consist 
of a set of social and economic goals that the state must apply in 
making laws but are usually not directly enforceable through the 
courts.  Even so, over time, these directive principles tend to be 
indirectly enforced; they often seep into the jurisprudence of 
constitutional courts.100
All of the above models demonstrate that justiciable social and 
economic rights are possible.  These constitutional safeguards can 
perform a necessary check upon the policy decisions of the 
legislative branch and ensure a truly just system by guaranteeing 
that some fundamental freedoms are not left solely to the 
discretion of the legislature.  In its Ninth General Comment, the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
  This can result in the courts giving the 
principles a more substantive nature as they are used to shape the 
contours of justiciable rights. 
101
The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social 
and cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond 
 also recommended that such judicial review protections 
extend to basic economic and social rights.  The Committee 
maintains: 
 
 96. INDIA CONST. pt. IV, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/ 
welcome.html. 
 97. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 45, available at http://www.taoiseach. 
gov.ie/attached_files/html%20files/Constitution%20of%20Ireland%20(Eng)Nov
2004.htm. 
 98. CONSTITUTION, Art. 13–24 (1999) (Nigeria), available at 
http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm# 
Chapter_2. 
 99. CONSTITUTION, Pmbl., Ch. XI (Namibia), available at 
http://www.orusovo.com/namcon. 
 100. See, e.g., the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu 
v. Abu Kavier Bar, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 725, in which the Court held that it has a duty to 
harmonize the fundamental rights of the Constitution with the Directive 
Principles.  Another example is the case of Unni Krishnan v. State of Andrah Pradesh, 
A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178, in which the Indian Supreme Court relied upon the 
Directive Principles to elevate the right to education, the mandate of Article 45, to 
the level of a fundamental right under Article 21, and directed the Executive to 
ensure its implementation.  For more on the Indian Supreme Court’s usage of the 
Directive Principles to broaden substantive protections, see JUSTICE B. N. 
SRIKRISHNA, INNOVATIONS BY THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 6–7 (2003), http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/jc/papers/jc_2003/ 
judges_papers/srikrishna.pdf. 
 101. See infra notes 237–46 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed 
discussion of the role of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
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the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and 
incompatible with the principle that the two sets of 
human rights are indivisible and interdependent.  It 
would also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to 
protect the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in society.102
In advocating for justiciable constitutional economic and 
social rights, I do not envision activist courts that usurp the 
legislature’s role as the primary budgetary decision-makers.  
Judicial intervention should be measured and leave the specific 
implementation decisions within the legislative realm.  For 
example, the courts may urge the legislature into action to realize 
basic economic and social rights while at the same time respecting 
the legislature’s choice of means as to the most appropriate 
methods to advance the rights.
 
Rather than weakening the separation of powers doctrine, I 
would instead argue that allowing judicial checks on budgetary 
decisions when they pertain to basic economic and social rights 
actually strengthens the separation of powers doctrine.  As with core 
civil and political rights, there should be certain economic and 
social needs that are not vulnerable to the whims of majority rule.  
Exposing legislative decisions related to economic and social rights 
to judicial review, along with decisions about civil and political 
rights, actually broadens the separation of powers doctrine by 
applying the same protective check on policies relating to all 
fundamental freedoms. 
103
The government of the day must take all steps to ensure 
that it satisfies social rights to minimum income, housing, 
education and health care, as far as it can, within the 
constraints of resources reasonably available to pursue 
them.  The judiciary would be able, I think, to make sure 
that the government does indeed take those steps.
  Cécile Fabre suggests a similar 
formulation for creating modest constitutional constraints on the 
government in relation to social rights: 
104
Like the arguments challenging the legitimacy of courts to 
involve themselves with economic and social rights, the arguments 
 
 
 102. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9 : The 
Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998), 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/escgencom9.htm. 
 103. Liebenberg, supra note 81, at 59–60. 
 104. Cécile Fabre, Constitutionalizing Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 283 
(1998) (footnote omitted). 
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questioning the competence of the courts to engage with these 
issues appear overstated after closer consideration.  The 
competency objection that is frequently raised against the inclusion 
of economic and social rights as justiciable rights is that judges are 
not economists or public policy experts and thus do not have the 
knowledge and experience necessary to assess the most effective 
policy measures for realizing these basic rights.105
Judges are widely recognized as competent to consider a 
variety of technical and scientific information and are deemed 
competent to rely upon expert testimony and evidence when 
necessary.  It seems that only when it comes to matters close to the 
market economy that judges are suddenly presumed incompetent 
to rely and depend upon the expertise of others in their decisions.  
Again, my proposal for the judiciary’s role is modest.  The courts 
can place a burden on the executive and legislature to justify the 
reasonableness of their policy choices in light of any constitutional 
commitments to economic and social rights.
  This would be a 
fair point to make if what was being proposed by the pro-
justiciability camp was creating a judicial power to draft budgetary 
policy.  Again, however, this assumes more than the desired 
outcome of those wanting legally enforceable economic and social 
rights, which is simply that budgetary decisions could be subject to 
judicial scrutiny when they pertain to the fulfillment of people’s 
most basic of needs. 
106  Here, I envision 
something similar to Mark Tushnet’s model of “weak judicial 
remedies.”107  In this model, courts identify the violation of a right 
but then provide only light oversight of a remedial plan’s 
implementation.108  Tushnet explains that this might mean 
requiring that “government officials develop plans that hold out 
some promise of eliminating the constitutional violation within a 
reasonably short, but unspecified time period.”109
The implementing officials may respond to such 
complaints or may come to the courts themselves to ask 
  Parties will stay 
in contact with the court throughout the remedial phase as 
needed.  Tushnet suggests: 
 
 105. See Bork, supra note 69, at 695–96; Cross, supra note 69, at 923–24; Davis, 
supra note 74, at 483–84; Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 69, at 37. 
 106. Liebenberg, supra note 81, at 60. 
 107. Mark Tushnet, Symposium, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial 
Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1910–11 (2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, Social Welfare]. 
 108. Id. at 1910. 
 109. Id. 
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for a modification of the plan in light of the experience 
they have had in attempting to implement it.  Sometimes 
the courts will agree with the plaintiffs and ratchet up the 
requirements, setting more precise timetables or 
identifying specific benchmarks the officials must reach.  
Sometimes the courts will agree with the officials and 
loosen the requirements to accord with the realities as 
they have developed.110
In contrast, “strong judicial remedies” are “mandatory injunctions 
that spell out in detail what government officials are to do by 
identifying goals, the achievement of which can be measured easily, 
for example, through obvious numerical measures.”
 
111
Tushnet argues that Government of the Republic of South Africa v. 
Grootboom
 
112 is a successful example of a weak remedies approach.113  
In Grootboom, the South African Constitutional Court held that the 
Constitution’s right of access to housing was justiciable,114 and 
found that government policies that resulted in the eviction of the 
desperately poor plaintiffs violated this constitutionally guaranteed 
right.115  The Court entered an order declaring that “the 
Constitution requires the state to devise and implement within its 
available resources a comprehensive and coordinated program 
progressively to realize the right of access to adequate housing”116 
but refused to find or define a minimum core right to shelter 
under the constitution.117  The Grootboom order did, however, 
require that the government adjust its existing housing plan in 
order to ensure that it contained an element that would provide 
housing opportunities for the “people in desperate need.”118
The Grootboom model is promising for courts at the early stages 
of adjudicating social and economic rights.  It strikes a balance 
between the concerns of legitimacy and competence of courts in 
the area, but at the same time names and defends the right to 
housing.  Grootboom rejects any categorical distinction based upon 
justiciability but is simultaneously sensitive to judicial overreach.  
This is the vision of justiciability that I will advance in Part IV when 
   
 
 110. Id. at 1910–11. 
 111. Id. at 1911. 
 112. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 113. Tushnet, Social Welfare, supra note 107, at 1903. 
 114. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR ¶ 20. 
 115. Id. ¶ 99. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Tushnet, Social Welfare, supra note 107, at 1904. 
 118. Id. at 1905. 
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I advocate for the cultivation of a right to shelter for children 
within United States domestic law. 
2. Beyond Negative Rights 
In addition to the distinction that is often made between 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights, a second contemporary 
distinction frequently drawn between economic and social rights 
on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other hand, 
purports to stem from the substantive nature of the rights.  
Economic and social rights are sometimes also referred to as 
“positive rights” because they often establish obligations for the 
state to take positive action towards some end.119  For example, the 
right to education requires a state to establish schools that meet a 
minimum standard in order to fulfill this requirement.  Civil and 
political rights, on the other hand, are often referred to as 
“negative rights” in that they create a right to be left alone—they 
carve out a realm of liberties in which a person is protected from 
state intrusion, such as with the right to freedom of speech and the 
right to religious exercise.120
This substantive distinction perceiving economic and social 
rights as positive, and civil and political rights as negative, is more 
misleading than it is useful.
 
121  Civil and political rights can both 
constrain and require state action, and the same is true for 
economic and social rights.  Many civil and political rights do 
require positive state action as integral to that right.122
 
 119. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 69. 
 120. See, e.g., id. 
 121. See WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 83 (arguing that the 
connection between the classical, liberal idea of rights and the constraint of 
negativity is contingent and illogical). 
 122. See Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights, supra note 71, at 1214 (stating 
that “[c]ivil rights implicate positive governmental action no less than social rights 
do”). 
  For 
instance, voting rights require the government to create the 
infrastructure and means to facilitate an election; the right to a fair 
trial similarly places obligations on states.  Conversely, the 
substance of basic economic and social rights could be negative in 
nature and still be robust, such as protecting individuals from state-
sponsored evictions from private lands and providing heightened 
protections for tenants facing eviction from public housing. 
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Robin West’s work is particularly helpful in eroding the 
positive/negative rights binary.  In her recent book Re-Imagining 
Justice, West challenges progressive and egalitarian legal theorists to 
disassociate the regressive, conservative, and libertarian notions of 
justice and the law from the potential of the law itself, and instead 
become invested in the work of understanding law’s progressive 
promise.123  West suggests the need to reconstruct the three ideals 
of justice—the Rule of Law, the content of our rights, and the idea 
of formal equal—in order to advance a progressive legalism that 
promotes moral goodness.124  Rejecting our current liberal state’s 
assumption that only negative rights must be promoted and 
protected is central to reconstructing our understanding of the 
content of rights.  West diagnoses our existing liberal state as being 
“structured by negative and atomistic rights” and “committed to 
securing the minimal preconditions of participation not in a good 
society, but in a free society.”125  At its core, a free society has “rights 
of autonomy, contract and property,” which are interpreted in ways 
that “ward off the danger of an overly zealous state.”126
Inspired by the fundamental human capabilities approach 
advanced by Amartya Sen
 
127 and Martha Nussbaum,128 West argues 
for a revitalized understanding of rights that goes beyond negative 
and atomistic rights.129
[A] liberal state similarly structured by rights, but 
committed to securing the minimal preconditions of 
capabilities as well as autonomy, would, I think, explicitly 
recognize additional fundamental rights, currently 
unrecognized or underrecognized by liberal states overly 
committed to the atomism and negativity of rights, 
including welfare rights and rights to work.
  West contends: 
130
West also notes that a specific right can include both positive and 
negative expectations.  A right can “be defined as including both 
the individual entitlement that follows from the moral obligations of 
liberal states, as well as the entitlements that follow from the 
 
 
 123. See WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 3–4, 9. 
 124. Id. at 3–4, 173. 
 125. Id. at 92. 
 126. Id. 
 127. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 54–86 (2000) (viewing 
poverty as capability deprivation). 
 128. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 4–15 (2001). 
 129. See WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 92–93. 
 130. Id. at 92. 
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constraints upon them.”131  In order to accord all individuals 
dignity, concern, and respect, West argues that sometimes the state 
must refrain from acting, yet sometimes must be required to act.132
A robust understanding of a child’s right to housing must 
contain both positive and negative dimensions.  Sometimes the 
right to housing might require the state to refrain from acting, 
either to advance a state interest like excluding individuals with 
drug-related offenses from public housing
 
133
3. Rethinking “Generations” of Rights 
 or to advance the 
interests of other individuals, like landlords, who turn to the state 
to recognize and enforce property and contract rights.  The most 
obvious example is broadening the doctrine of mitigation in an 
eviction circumstance when children are living in the residence in 
question.  In this scenario, a broad understanding of a child’s right 
to housing as necessary to ensure her human dignity and 
subsistence needs could act as a shield against state action in a 
variety of ways, perhaps providing her household with the 
opportunity to rebut the claims of criminality imputed to a 
household member, to disassociate from any criminal actions of 
household members if they are occurring, or to obtain the funds 
necessary to become current on rent.   
Additionally, a right to housing could sometimes require the 
state to take action by, for example, requiring the state to 
reconsider a budgetary decision or to provide more beds in an 
emergency shelter.  A right to shelter as developed within either 
state or federal law could have both positive and negative 
components.  The balance between the two components can be 
flexible—it is likely to vary between forums, both between state and 
federal law and between different states, as well as over time, 
depending upon the needs and norms of society.   
A final distinction often made between economic and social 
rights, and civil and political rights, is framed in terms of 
 
 131. Id. at 83. 
 132. Id. 
 133. A child’s right to shelter seems to require rethinking the zero-tolerance 
crime policy upheld in HUD v. Rucker, which did not consider the interests of 
children to maintain housing when tenants are subject to eviction due to a 
violation of the zero-tolerance criminal activity lease terms required by the public 
housing agency under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  535 U.S. 125, 127–32 
(2002). 
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generations of rights.  Economic and social rights, which include, 
inter alia, concepts like the right to work, the right to education, 
and the right to shelter, are referred to as “second generation” 
rights.134  These rights are then distinguished from and portrayed 
as coming after what are called “first generation” rights, which are 
civil and political rights like the right to speech, the right to 
religious freedom, and the right to be free from torture.135
It is true that the earliest written constitutions like the English 
Bill of Rights of 1688, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen of 1789, and the United States Constitution of 1789 
primarily recognized negative rights.
  This 
distinction relies upon the flawed “positive/negative rights” 
distinction and results in an imprecise historical impression that 
privileges civil and political rights.  The generational syllogism 
flows like this: negative rights constraining state action predated 
positive rights obliging state action; civil and political rights are 
inherently negative in nature whereas economic and social rights 
are inherently positive in nature; therefore, civil and political rights 
came a generation before economic and social rights.  This line of 
reasoning creates the misconception that all rights now considered 
civil and political predated all rights now considered economic and 
social, which is simply not the case. 
136
 
 134. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32–47 (1982); Tushnet, Social 
Welfare, supra note 107, at 1895–96; JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 4–5 (1993). 
 135. WALDRON, supra note 134, at 5.  See infra notes 142–55 and accompanying 
text (discussing further the changing substance of rights included in domestic bills 
of rights as notions of citizenship have evolved). 
 136. In the words of Sandra Liebenberg, a South African human rights expert, 
“the traditional liberal conception of a bill of rights is to act as a shield designed to 
protect individual liberties from arbitrary and excessive applications of state 
power.”  See Liebenberg, supra note 81, at 57. 
  Even so, the second 
statement in the above syllogism fails because the positive/negative 
distinction does not directly map onto the landscape of political 
and civil rights versus economic and social rights.  If the 
generational language should be used at all, it should be negative 
rights (or to incorporate West’s conception of rights as able to 
include negative and position dimensions, the negative component 
of rights) that are termed first generation and positive rights that 
are termed second generation.  If we look to the substantive 
realization of political and civil rights and how long it took for 
marginalized groups like racial minorities and women to be 
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granted basic civil and political rights, the existing generational 
framework becomes even more tenuous. 
Unfortunately, this generational language has had some 
traction within the human rights movement.  Even though 
economic and social rights have been entrenched within key 
human rights documents as interdependent and indivisible with 
civil and political rights since the birth of the movement,137 they 
have not received equal attention to civil and political rights within 
the human rights community.  Groups like Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch have only recently begun paying 
attention to violations of economic and social rights.  In a strong 
critique of the neglect of economic and social rights within the 
human rights movement, Professor Philip Alston, former Chair of 
the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Committee, claims that of the modest resources that the 
international community devotes to human rights, 95% goes 
“entirely to civil and political rights.”138  Furthermore, Alston claims 
that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the 
precursor to the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
“devote[d] about 90% of its energies to civil and political rights.”139  
The remaining 10%, he argues, was mostly devoted to 
“unproductive discussions” about the right to development, “which 
actually contains very few elements genuinely concerned with 
realizing economic, social, or cultural rights.”140  Recent 
developments within the human rights framework have helped to 
increase attention to economic and social rights.  For instance, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee and the 
jurisprudential work they have been doing developing the 
substance of rights through their issuance of General Comments, as 
well as the work of United Nations Special Rapporteurs on housing 
issues,141
 
 137. See WALDRON, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
 138. Philip Alston, Making Economic and Social Rights Count: A Strategy for the 
Future, 68 POL. Q. 188, 188 (1997). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See infra Part IV. 
 has helped undo the “second class status” of these rights 
as implied by the generational language. 
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B. Social Citizenship and the Expanding Constitutionalization of Rights 
In the past century, evolving notions of citizenship and the 
nature of the social contract between individuals and the state has 
resulted in states adopting more positive obligations towards their 
citizens.  T.H. Marshall’s work on the evolution of Western 
conceptions of citizenship reveals the expanding definition of 
domestically protected rights and provides a more nuanced 
description of their evolution than does the generational language 
critiqued above.142  Marshall identifies three stages in the evolution 
of Western conceptions of citizenship.143  First, civil rights were the 
great achievement of the eighteenth century, establishing the 
notion of the equality of most members of society before the law.144  
Next, the nineteenth century brought significant advances in 
political rights, allowing for the increasing political participation in 
the realm of public decision-making.145  Finally, social rights were 
the defining rights concept of the twentieth century.146  In order to 
make it possible for more members of society to enjoy a satisfactory 
life than ever before, the protective function of the state to 
promote the welfare of its citizens emerged.  As Tushnet explains, 
“[w]orking-class movements in Western Europe gained political 
power and with it began to show that governments could take on 
the task of guaranteeing social rights.”147
At the same time that many countries began incorporating 
these rights in their constitutions, the number of countries with 
bills of rights also increased exponentially.  The end of the Second 
World War, decolonization, and the end of the Cold War produced 
“waves of new constitution-making” around the world.
 
148
 
 142. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1950). 
 143. Id. at 10. 
 144. Id. at 10–11, 14–17.  I purposely use the term “most” instead of “all” here 
because in much of the Western world, civil and political rights were much later in 
coming for large classes of people, including women and persons of color, who 
often did not enjoy these basic human rights until the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth century. 
 145. Id. at 19–21. 
 146. Id. at 21. 
 147. Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights, supra note 71, at 1210; see also 
Tushnet, Social Welfare, supra note 107, at 1913 (stating that it is a “fixed point after 
1945” that constitutions must contain guarantees of social and economic rights). 
 148. Philip Alston, Preface, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF 
RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1999) [hereinafter PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS]. 
  These 
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twentieth century geopolitical changes created the political space 
in which numerous ethnic and national groups achieved self-
determination, began the process of state building or rebuilding, 
and established or revised domestic legal systems.  In Central and 
Eastern Europe, more than twenty-five national constitutions have 
been revised or were drafted for the first time in the years since the 
Cold War ended.149  The African continent has also seen many new 
and revised constitutions in the past few decades; in French-
speaking African states alone, twenty new constitutions have come 
into force since 1990.150  Modern constitutions often expand upon 
the negative rights protected and frequently impose positive 
obligations upon states to take certain actions.  Many twentieth 
century bills of rights move beyond protecting only negative rights 
to also setting positive requirements upon the state to protect and 
fulfill certain basic rights.151
Most commonly, these types of positive legal guarantees in 
domestic constitutions relate to ensuring equality for all under the 
law, protecting citizens from discrimination, and providing a right 
to social security.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982)
 
152 and South African Bill of Rights (1996)153
Philip Alston argues that bills of rights at the turn of the 
twenty-first century are more expansive than at any time 
previously.
 are examples of 
contemporary constitutions that create positive rights by codifying 
duties upon the state to take positive action.   
154
Bills of rights are taken more seriously, their enforcement 
provisions are significantly more elaborate, far-reaching 
and potentially effective than ever before, and their 
relationship with the international normative regime that 
has been constructed in the human rights field gives them 
a coherence and a momentum which they have not had in 
  Alston suggests that now: 
 
 149. Philip Alston, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights, in 
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 1 [hereinafter Alston, Comparative 
Analysis]. 
 150. Id. at 1–2.  See also id. at 1–2 nn.2 and 4 for a complete listing of the new 
constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. 
 151. See supra notes 84–100 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, Ch. 11 
(U.K.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter.  
 153. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Ch. 2 – Bill of Rights, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm. 
 154. See Alston, Comparative Analysis, supra note 149. 
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previous eras.155
C. Promoting the Interdependence of Basic Human Rights 
 
As notions of citizenship and the substance of basic human 
rights have broadened, so too have understandings about the 
relationships between basic rights.  By including social rights like 
the right to education and social security alongside civil and 
political rights, modern constitutions recognize the interdependent 
nature of basic human rights, a principle that is explored in more 
detail in the following section. 
Perhaps the most problematic byproduct of the essentialized 
distinctions between the categories of rights critiqued above is that 
the classifications are usually employed in a hierarchy of rights, to 
the detriment of economic and social rights like the right to 
shelter.156  Yet civil and political rights are no more essential or 
fundamental to human dignity than are economic and social rights.  
On the contrary, the fulfillment of basic economic and social rights 
is essential in order to enjoy basic civil and political rights.  
Unfulfilled economic and social rights can result in such stress and 
social exclusion that it becomes impossible to participate 
meaningfully in political and civic life.  As former United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and President of Ireland 
Mary Robinson posits, how can a person meaningfully realize her 
right to vote, or participate in other basic aspects of a democracy, 
when she does not have a roof over her head or her other 
subsistence needs met?157
The principles of the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights have been repeatedly affirmed within international 
human rights law.  Human rights instruments like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, which are discussed in more detail in the following 
 
 
 155. See id.  According to Alston, a surprising 82% of the national constitutions 
that were drafted between 1788 and 1948 contained some form of protection for 
rights now considered human rights, although admittedly these were mostly civil 
and political rights.  See id. at 3.  This trend continued and 93% of the 
constitutions drafted between 1949 and 1975 included human rights provisions.  
Id.  Although no such statistics are available for the new constitutions post-1975, 
this rate has undoubtedly continued to increase. 
 156. Some of the salience of this bifurcation can be attributed to the 
ideological divide between the East and West during the Cold War.  See infra notes 
224–27 and accompanying text. 
 157. Robinson, supra note 68. 
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section, exemplify the idea that all basic human rights are 
interdependent and interrelated.  The Vienna Declaration, issued 
at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, powerfully 
proclaimed these principles: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.158
The indivisibility and interdependency of fundamental human 
rights is even more intuitive when children are the primary rights 
bearers being considered.  For a child, having her basic economic 
and social rights realized may even be more important to her 
growth and human dignity than are her civil and political rights.  
Many basic political rights are often significantly restrained until 
the age of majority, and until then, children are considered 
virtually represented by their adult caregivers.
 
159
 
 
  In contrast, food, 
shelter, and education—all interests protected by basic economic 
and social rights—are critical for her physical, psychological, and 
intellectual development.   
Before moving to a discussion of the international human 
rights sources of a right to shelter in Part IV, I first consider the 
historical support for welfare rights within the United States.   
 
 158. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on 
Human Rights, Part 1, ¶ 5, July 12, 1993, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument. 
 159. But see Harry Brighouse, Symposium, How Should Children Be Heard?, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 705–11 (2003) (arguing that children should be consulted in 
several decision-making arenas including custody arrangements and government 
“child policy”—policies affecting and of interest to children). 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/3
  
2009] JUSTICE FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN 909 
III. SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
HISTORY 
Poor America, of what avail is all her wealth, if the 
individuals comprising the nation are wretchedly poor?  If  
they live in squalor, in filth, in crime, with hope and joy 
gone, a homeless, soilless army of human prey.160
In the past several decades, the United States government has 
signed but failed to ratify several international human rights 
treaties that protect economic and social rights.
 
–Emma Goldman (1917) 
 
161  The United 
States is a notorious outlier in its failure to ratify the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”); at this point, Somalia is the only 
other state who has not ratified the CRC.162  On the international 
stage, the United States stands virtually alone in denying the 
validity of economic, social, and cultural rights.  At a 2005 meeting 
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United 
States was the lone dissenter in separate votes of fifty-two to one on 
resolutions on the right to food and the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.163  This suggests 
a level of skepticism and perhaps even hostility among recent 
American leaders about economic and social rights, and human 
rights more generally,164
 
 160. EMMA GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 54 (Dover Publications 
ed., 1969) (1917). 
 161. The United States government has signed but not yet ratified the 
ICESCR, CRC, or CEDAW.  OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 11 (2004), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS].  See 
generally Office of the U.N. Comm’r for Human Rights, Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm; 
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/index.htm; ICESCR, supra note 
64.  Like the UDHR, both the CRC and CEDAW portray economic and social 
rights as interdependent with civil and political rights, and protect all basic human 
rights. 
 162. STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra note 161. 
 163. See Ian Seiderman, Letter to the Editor: F.D.R.’s Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
21, 2005 (late edition), at A22.  Mr. Seiderman is legal adviser to the International 
Commission of Jurists.  Id. 
 that is as disturbing as it is internationally 
 164. At the recent Beijing +10 conference of the United Nations Commission 
on the Status of Women, the United States appeared opposed to recognizing any 
additional human rights.  The United States delegation created significant 
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anomalous. 
In this section, I argue that a respect and commitment to 
social welfare rights and the redistributive values behind it has 
played an influential role in American political and legal discourse 
at various points in our history.  While social welfare rights have 
occupied a contested terrain in political discourse throughout 
American history, many American political leaders and organized 
movements have advocated for social welfare rights at various 
points throughout United States history.  Furthermore, the United 
States was a crucial player in the framing of the founding 
institutions and documents of the international human rights 
system, as well as the principle of human dignity and the 
interdependence of rights that are enshrined in the system. 
As Elizabeth Bussiere explains, the argument that welfare 
rights are fundamentally at odds with the American political 
tradition “assumes a unidimensional and an ahistorical view of 
American political thought.”165  There have been many moments in 
American history when business and government have been 
confronted with populist movements advocating for social 
protections in ways that challenged the individualistic, market-
oriented notions of freedom associated with John Locke and Adam 
Smith.166  Bussiere points to two longstanding traditions in 
American political thought that could be used to establish “the 
government’s obligation to satisfy the subsistence needs of society’s 
most vulnerable members.”167
 
controversy when it refused to sign a statement supporting the original Beijing 
platform of action unless it was amended to say that the platform does not create 
any new human rights or the right to abortion.  See Warren Hoge, Panel Backs 
Women’s Rights After U.S. Drops Abortion Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, at A5.  After 
dominating the conference dialogue for several days, the United States delegation 
finally agreed to drop its proposed amendment, saying it had accomplished its 
goal by receiving reassurances from other delegations on its points of concern.  See 
id.; Mary-Ann Stephenson, It Will Take All Our Energy to Stand Still: Bush’s America Is 
Waging a Global Battle Against Women’s Rights, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2005, at 24. 
 165. See ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, 
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 6 (1997).  Bussiere 
argues that the failure of the Warren Court to constitutionalize welfare rights did 
not stem from a “fatal flaw” in America’s liberal political tradition, but rather from 
the intellectual and institutional dynamics of legal doctrines and decision-making 
operating within the Supreme Court at that time.  Id. at 21. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
 167. Id. at 21. 
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One was a natural-law tradition that found powerful 
expression in Revolutionary thought and that was revived 
by the radical artisan movements of the 1830s, when 
Workingmen created a powerful proto-welfare-rights 
philosophy out of deeply rooted natural-law and civic-
republication principles.  The second, “maternalism,” 
dated back to the Jacksonian era and found its most 
potent political expression in the Progressive-era 
movement for mothers’ pensions.  The former grounded 
civic responsibilities toward the poor as a whole in the 
natural right to self-preservation.  The latter stressed the 
civic obligation toward mothers, especially impoverished 
mothers, on account of the fundamental role they play in 
the moral development of children—the nation’s future 
citizens.168
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, under the leadership of 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and in the wake of the 
economic depression around the world, many American 
policymakers supported efforts to strengthen and promote 
economic and social rights, although they did not always use that 
language.
 
169  During this period between the two World Wars, there 
was a realization among Western leaders that widespread 
unemployment and poverty had fostered political upheaval and a 
rise in oppressive totalitarian regimes.170  According to Asbjørn 
Eide, a Norwegian human rights scholar, this “led to a genuine 
interest [within the West] in securing economic and social rights, 
not only for their own sake but also for the preservation of 
individual freedom and democracy.”171
 
 168. Id. at 6–7. 
 169. See infra notes 173–88 and accompanying text. 
 170. Asbjørn Eide, Promoting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Obligations of 
States and Accountability of Non-State Actors, Paper presented at the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Second Global Forum on Human 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 10 Oct. 2000, 4, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/events/global_forum/2000/eide.pdf [hereinafter 
Eide, Promoting Rights]. 
 171. Id. 
  At the same time that the 
American New Dealers were increasing their political influence, 
British social reformers were similarly encouraging the United 
Kingdom’s government to be more sympathetic to economic and 
social rights.  The arguments put forth by social reformers and 
progressive political leaders resonated around the world with 
people struggling against “the devastating effects of extremist 
37
Wiik: Justice for America's Homeless Children: Cultivating a Child's Ri
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
912 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
nationalism and totalitarianism, while simultaneously fighting 
against the effects of callous economic laissez-faire, which ushered in 
the Great Depression and in turn fueled the emergence and appeal 
of authoritarian nationalism.”172
President Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union Address to the 
United States Congress articulated the importance of economic 
and social rights to peace and democracy.
 
173  In the address, which 
is known as his “Four Freedoms Address,” Roosevelt spelled out 
“four essential human freedoms,” which he argued were the 
essentials of any healthy and strong democracy—the freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and freedom 
from want.174  Roosevelt defined the last, freedom from want, as 
“economic understandings which will secure to every nation a 
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the 
world.”175
Later in 1941, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill adopted the Atlantic Charter, agreeing to eight 
“common principles in the national policies” of the United States 
and United Kingdom.
 
176  The Charter voiced their desire to bring 
about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic 
field with the goal of “securing, for all, improved labor standards, 
economic advancement and social security.”177  Shortly after the 
signing of the Atlantic Charter, lawyers and scholars in the Western 
world initiated serious efforts to plan and prepare for what would 
become the United Nations.  As Eide explains, the initial planning 
stages of the United Nations were mainly carried out within the 
United States administration, influenced “to a large extent” by the 
goals articulated in the Four Freedoms Address.178
 
 172. Asbjørn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 15 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina 
Krause & Allan Rosas, eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Eide, Economic and Social 
Rights]. 
 173. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address to 
the United States Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.fdrlibrary. 
marist.edu/4free.html. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. The Atlantic Charter, ¶ 1, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp. 
 177. Id. ¶ 5. 
 178. Eide, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 172, at 14. 
  In 1942, the 
American Law Institute, comprised mostly of American and 
Canadian scholars but also involving other international experts, 
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undertook to draft and advise those developing the United Nations 
on essential human rights.179  The Law Institute established a 
working group that prepared one of the first drafts of what would 
become the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”); 
this draft contained most of the social and economic rights that 
were subsequently included in the UDHR.180
A few years later, in his 1944 State of the Union Address, 
President Roosevelt argued even more strongly for economic and 
social rights, calling on Congress to consider implementing a 
second Bill of Rights known as the “Economic Bill of Rights.”
 
181  In 
that speech, delivered in the darkest days of the Second World 
War, Roosevelt not only argued for the importance of the physical 
security of nations but also the need for economic security, social 
security, and moral security.182  The President argued that a “basic 
essential to peace . . . is a decent standard of living for all individual 
men and women and children in all nations” and “[f]reedom from 
fear is eternally linked with freedom from want.”183  He suggested 
that political rights were no longer adequate to assure equality in 
the pursuit of happiness.184
We have come to a clear realization of the fact . . . that 
true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free 
men.’ People who are hungry [and] out of a job are the 
stuff of which dictatorships are made.  In our day these 
economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We 
have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under 
which a new basis of security and prosperity can be 
  Instead, Roosevelt argued: 
 
 179. Id. at 15. 
 180. Id.  For more information on the American Law Institute’s role in 
drafting the UDHR, see American Law Institute, Statement of Essential Human 
Rights, by a Committee Appointed by the American Law Institute, 243 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 18 (1946). 
 181. For a recent analysis of President Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights speech 
and the argument that its principles should be revitalized, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION & WHY WE NEED IT 
MORE THAN EVER (2004).  See also Bob Herbert, A Radical in the White House, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, at A19 (commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of President 
Roosevelt’s death and applauding the progressive vision he set forth in the Second 
Bill of Rights). 
 182. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address to 
the United States Congress (Jan. 11, 1944), available at 
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. 
39
Wiik: Justice for America's Homeless Children: Cultivating a Child's Ri
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
914 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
established for all—regardless of station, or race or 
creed.185
• The right to a useful and remunerative job in the 
industries, or shops or farms or mines of the nation; 
 
Roosevelt advocated that several specific economic rights, 
including a right to housing, should be protected in a second 
American Bill of Rights: 
• The right to earn enough to provide adequate food 
and clothing and recreation; 
• The right of (every) farmers to raise and sell their (his) 
products at a return which will give them (him) and 
their (his) families (family) a decent living; 
• The right of every business man, large and small, to 
trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair 
competition and domination by monopolies at home 
or abroad; 
• The right of every family to a decent home ; 
• The right to adequate medical care and the 
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; 
• The right to adequate protection from the economic 
fears of old age, and sickness, and accident and 
unemployment; 
• And finally, the right to a good education.186
In Roosevelt’s eyes, “[a]ll of these rights spell security” for the 
United States.
 
187
[America] must be prepared to move forward, in the 
implementation of these rights, to new goals of human 
happiness and well-being.  America’s own rightful place in 
the world depends in large part upon how fully these and 
similar rights have been carried into practice for all our 
citizens.  For unless there is security here at home there 
cannot be lasting peace in the world.
  Looking forward, he advocated the following for 
after the United States won the Second World War: 
188
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 
In the next section, I discuss the sources of protection for the 
right to housing and other basic economic and social rights within 
the realm of international human rights law. 
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IV. A CHILD’S RIGHT TO SHELTER IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself [or herself] and of 
his [or her] family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,  
 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his [or her] control. 
 
[Children] are entitled to special care and assistance. All 
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy 
the same social protection.189
The right to adequate housing has been recognized in a wide 
range of international instruments, including the UDHR,
 
190 the 
ICESCR,191 and the CRC.192
Economic and social rights have been an organic and central 
part of the body of international human rights since the origins of 
the formalized international human rights movement in the early 
twentieth century.  Eide argues that economic rights found 
acceptance at the international level even before civil and political 
rights did.
  This section discusses the development 
of the right to housing as part of the development of economic and 
social rights, and argues that there are heightened standards on 
State Parties to protect and fulfill these rights as applied to a child. 
193  In the late nineteenth century, workers’ rights 
advocates began to organize internationally and held a conference 
in Germany in 1890 to adopt an international agreement aimed at 
improving labor conditions.194
 
 189. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 25 U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [hereinafter UDHR].  Article 25(2) 
reads, in full, “[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance.  All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same 
social protection.”  Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. ICESCR, supra note 64. 
 192. CRC, supra note 66.  See infra notes 250–66 and accompanying text 
(analyzing the economic and social rights included in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child). 
 193. Eide, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 172, at 27. 
 194. Id. 
  Based on that group’s groundwork, 
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the Swiss Government convened conferences in Berne in 1905 and 
1906 to discuss working conditions.195  As a result, some of the first 
international conventions in the field of economic and social rights 
were adopted.196  After the turmoil of World War I had receded, 
these early efforts to protect economic rights were renewed with 
the establishment of the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) 
in 1919.197
The body of international law known as international human 
rights law was born in the dark days after the Second World War.  
The United Nations Charter was adopted in June of 1945 as the 
War waned and reconstruction efforts began around the world.
 
198  
The Charter was entered into force in October of that year and 
places the economic and social wellbeing of humans resolutely 
within the purpose and remit of the United Nations.199  The 
Preamble of the United Nations Charter aims to “promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “to 
employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples.”200  Additionally, 
the Charter states that one of the explicit purposes of the United 
Nations is “to achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”201  It 
pledges that the United Nations will become “a cent[er] for 
harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.”202
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. For more information about the ILO’s history and work, see its website at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 
2, 2008). 
 198. U.N. Charter Preamble, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/ 
charter/preamble.shtml. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 202. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 4. 
 
This next section explores the major human rights treaties that 
protect economic and social rights, including the right to housing.  
I provide a brief survey of the development of the treaties and the 
provisions that pertain to the right to housing and children’s 
economic and social rights.   
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A. Economic and Social Rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”) 
In December of 1948, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the UDHR,203 which was the first significant international 
statement of human rights principles.  The UDHR is not a treaty, 
and therefore does not create obligations that are legally binding 
on State Parties.  But because the UDHR is widely used as the 
primary statement of what are considered human rights, it is 
regarded as having legal significance and has been considered 
customary international law by American courts204 and 
commentators.205
The UDHR embodies a holistic vision of human rights and 
speaks about the centrality of economic, social, cultural, civil, and 
political rights to the preservation of human dignity and 
freedom.
 
206  Mary Ann Glendon explains that although overall 
there was strong agreement within the fledgling United Nations 
about the rights to be included within the UDHR, economic and 
social rights were the most controversial rights in the process.207  
The economic and social rights provisions within the UDHR were 
strongly encouraged by Latin American countries and supported by 
the United States but balked at by many of the socialist Eastern 
European countries for not being strong enough.208
The UDHR also emphasizes the inalienable nature of all 
fundamental human rights.
 
209  In the words of Eide, the declaration 
represents a “package of interrelated and interdependent rights,” 
which are indivisible.210
 
 203. UDHR, supra note 189. 
 204. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that 
“several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has 
become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law”) (citing Kuldip 
Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 813, 816–17 (1978); Humphrey Waldlock, Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law and the Significance of the European Convention, INT’L & COMP. L.Q., 
Supp. Publ. No. 11 at 15 (1965)). 
 205. DAVID SHIMAN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE, PART I: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
(1999), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/tb1b/index.html. 
 206. UDHR, supra note 189. 
 207. Mary Ann Glendon, Professor of Law, Harvard University, Caritas Helder 
Camara Lecture Series: Human Rights for All, Melbourne, Australia, (June 2002) 
available at http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/social_justice/sj0006.html. 
 208. Id. 
 209. UDHR, supra note 189. 
 210. Eide, Promoting Rights, supra note 170, at 2. 
  Since the adoption of the UDHR, the 
43
Wiik: Justice for America's Homeless Children: Cultivating a Child's Ri
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
918 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights have been 
regularly reaffirmed within human rights documents, including in 
more recent United Nations treaties like the CEDAW and the CRC. 
References to human dignity and social progress permeated 
the UDHR, but the most explicit proclamations of economic and 
social rights can be found in Articles 22 through 26.211  Article 22 of 
the UDHR states that everyone has the right to social security and is 
entitled to the realization of the economic, social, and cultural 
rights indispensable for one’s dignity and the free development of 
one’s personality.212  Article 23 protects economic rights related to 
work, including the right to work, just and favorable work 
conditions, equal pay for equal work, and the right to form and 
join trade unions.213  Article 23(3) contains a right to a living wage, 
stating that everyone who works has the right to just and favorable 
remuneration “ensuring for himself [or herself] and his [or her] 
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection.”214  Article 24 
protects the right to rest and leisure.215  The section of the UDHR 
most directly relevant to a child’s right to adequate housing is 
Article 25’s right to an adequate standard of living, including 
“food, clothing, housing and medical care, and necessary social 
services.”216  This is followed by the right to education enshrined in 
Article 26, which is a right of particular interest to—although not 
exclusive to—children.217
B. The International Bill of Rights: The ICESCR and the ICCPR 
 
In order to strengthen the legal standing of these basic human 
rights, the United Nations decided to integrate the rights protected 
in the UDHR into legally binding treaties.  An initial United 
 
 211. Property rights, another important subclass of economic and social rights, 
are also enshrined in the UDHR.  Article 17 states that everyone has a right to own 
property, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her] property.  
UDHR, supra note 189, at art. 17.  Article 27(2) protects intellectual property 
rights, and reads “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.”  Id. at art. 27(2). 
 212. Id. at art. 22. 
 213. Id. at art. 23. 
 214. Id. at art. 23(2). 
 215. Id. at art. 24. 
 216. Id. at art. 25. 
 217. Id. at art. 26. 
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Nations General Assembly Resolution on the subject, passed in 
December of 1950, pledged to adopt a single convention that 
recognized the interdependence of all categories of human 
rights—civil, political, economic, social, and cultural.218  Many 
Western states, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, 
advocated that two separate treaties should be drafted—one for 
civil and political rights and another for economic, social, and 
cultural rights.219  Eastern states, which were more likely to hold 
socialist values, were also comfortable with this division, in part 
because of a fear that a Western “veto” of a single covenant might 
result in no international protections for economic and social 
rights.220  Eventually, campaigners arguing to split the drafting 
process between the two categories of rights were successful in 
persuading the General Assembly to reverse its first decision, and a 
1952 General Assembly Resolution resulted in a bifurcated drafting 
process.221  The result was the creation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), known collectively as the International Bill of 
Rights.222  The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR but 
at the present time has only signed the ICESCR.223
Chisanga Puta-Chekwe and Nora Flood argue that the decision 
 
 
 218. G.A. Res. 421(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, at 42, U.N. Doc. 
A/1775 (1950).  For more detailed discussion of this shift, see Asbjørn Eide and 
Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 3 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & 
Allan Rosas, eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. G.A. Res. 543 (VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 36, U.N. Doc. 
A/2119 (1952). 
 222. ICESCR, supra note 64; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].  Both the ICESCR and the ICCPR 
are available at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ainstls1.htm. 
 223. University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties – USA, available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/research/ratification-USA.html; Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principle International Human Rights 
Treaties, (June 9, 2004),  available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  For 
an argument that the debate about the United States’ ratification of the ICESCR 
should be more internally focused, and the benefits of ratification for Americans 
emphasized, see Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 392–93 
(1990). 
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to separate the basic human rights in the UDHR into the two 
covenants largely stemmed from conflicting political ideologies 
between East and West and misconceptions about human rights, 
rather than from fundamental differences between these types of 
rights.224  Unfortunately, the twin covenants rigidified the 
perceptions that economic, social, and cultural rights are different 
“both in value and in kind” from civil and political rights.225  The 
Cold War years further entrenched this division, as economic and 
social rights fell out of favor with Western countries because they 
were increasingly seen as the province of communist Eastern bloc 
states.226  Glendon argues that the Cold War wrought havoc with 
the principle of the interdependence of fundamental rights—while 
the United States and its Cold War allies emphasized the political 
and civil rights, the Soviet bloc championed the social and 
economic provisions.227  She writes, “[w]hat the framers [of the 
UDHR] had joined together the two super-powers drove 
asunder.”228
1. Economic and Social Rights in the ICCPR and ICESCR 
 
While the right to shelter is most strongly supported by the 
provisions of the ICESCR, the ICCPR contains several negative 
housing-related rights, including that everyone shall have the 
freedom to choose their residence229 and that no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his [or her] 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.230  The ICESCR, on the 
other hand, includes several positive social welfare rights, and some 
are specific to housing and children.231  Article 10 of the Covenant 
states that “special measures of protection and assistance should be 
taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any 
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions.”232
 
 224. Puta-Chekwe & Flood, supra note 69, at 39. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Glendon, supra note 207. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. ICCPR, supra note 64, at art. 12(1). 
 230. Id. at art. 17(1). 
 231. ICESCR, supra note 64. 
 232. Id. at art. 10(3). 
  
Article 11 of the ICESCR obliges State Parties to recognize “the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to 
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the continuous improvement of living conditions,” and requires 
State Parties to take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of 
this right.233  Under the ICESCR, then, the human right to 
adequate housing is a component or derivative right of the broader 
right to an adequate standard of living.  Finally, Article 12 of the 
ICESCR recognizes the right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, and orders State 
Parties to take steps necessary for the healthy development of 
children.234
2. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
Although the ICESCR was proposed in 1952, it took more than 
twenty years to finalize the text of the Covenant and it did not enter 
into force until January of 1976.235  In its first decade of existence, 
there was no enforcement body, and thus the ICESCR was merely 
“a textual reference point subject to the speculative claims of both 
its proponents and detractors.”236  Finally, in 1985, the Economic 
and Social Council created the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to monitor the Covenant.237  
The creation of the Committee as an oversight body was a major 
achievement in the protection and development of economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  As Matthew Craven explains, since its 
inception, “the Committee has begun to reinvigorate the Covenant 
by developing a meaningful system of supervision [over the 
ICESCR] and generating a clearer understanding” of its terms.238
 
 233. Id. at art. 11(1) (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. at art. 12(1)–(2)(a). 
 235. U.N. Treaty Collection, Human Rights, http://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=321&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2009) (verifying the date the ICESCR came into force).  See also, MATTHEW 
CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 16–22 (1995) (discussing the lengthy 
process from when the decision was first made to draft a bill of human rights in 
1947 to when the ICESCR was finally ratified in 1974). 
 236. CRAVEN, supra note 235, at 1. 
 237. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet No. 16 (Rev. 1) (June 25, 1993), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs16.htm (examining many of the key 
issues relating to the ICESCR and the work of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in monitoring the treaty). 
 238. CRAVEN, supra note 235, at 6. 
  
The Committee is comprised of eighteen independent experts in 
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human rights who are elected by State Parties to four-year terms.239
The Committee has also begun a process of contributing to 
the normative and substantive development provisions of the 
ICESCR through its issuance of General Comments on various 
issues pertaining to economic, social, and cultural rights.  To date, 
the Committee has issued nineteen General Comments on subjects 
ranging from the nature of State Parties’ obligations under the 
ICESCR, to the right to education, to the right to food.
  
The Committee regularly reviews reports submitted by State Parties 
and issues concluding comments on their progress. 
240  Two of 
the nineteen General Comments address housing issues: General 
Comment 4 entitled “The Right to Adequate Housing” and 
General Comment 7 entitled “Forced Evictions, and the Right to 
Adequate Housing.”241
General Comment 4, which the Committee issued in 1991,
 
242 is 
particularly helpful for formulating what a right to adequate 
housing means.  In Comment 4, the Committee identifies seven 
aspects of the right that should be considered when determining 
whether particular forms of shelter constitute “adequate housing” 
for the purposes of the ICESCR.243
1) Legal security of tenure – “a degree of security of tenure which 
guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, 
harassment, and other threats;” 
  These seven aspects of the right 
to housing are: 
 
2) Availability of services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure – 
“essential for health, security, comfort, and nutrition;” 
3) Affordability – so that “personal or household financial costs 
associating with housing [is at] a level that the attainment 
 
 239. For a list of the current Committee members and more information 
about the selection process, see Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human 
Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Members, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/members.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2009).  The Committee’s official website is http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu2/6/cescr.htm. 
 240. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – General Comments, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/econ.htm. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. U.N. Committee on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1991/4 (Dec. 13, 1991), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,GENERAL,, 
47a7079a1,0.html [hereinafter General Comment No. 4]. 
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and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or 
compromised;” 
4) Habitability – requires that inhabitants have adequate space 
and are protected “from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or 
other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease 
vectors;” 
5) Accessibility – requires that disadvantaged groups such as the 
elderly, children, the physically disabled, and mentally ill are 
accorded full and sustainable access to housing resources.  
Housing law and policy should “take fully into account the 
special housing needs of these groups;” 
6) Location – of adequate housing must “[allow] access to 
employment options, health-care services, schools, child-
care centers, and other social facilities;” and 
7) Cultural adequacy – which means that “the way that housing is 
constructed, the building materials used and the policies 
supporting these must appropriately enable the expression 
of cultural identity and diversity of housing.”244
The Committee’s work in developing the substance of the 
ICESCR is especially welcome because an argument often made 
against creating legally enforceable economic and social rights is 
that these rights are simply too vague, nebulous, and unclear to be 
enforced by any domestic courts.  Some claim that the 
international instruments that deal with economic and social rights 
are ambiguously worded and aspirational, and thus it would be 
inappropriate, if not impossible, to make them justiciable.  This is 
also a misconception.  Economic and social rights are no more 
inherently vague than civil and political rights.  The less developed 
jurisprudence of economic and social rights is due to the lack of 
attention paid to this effort rather than the nature of these rights.  
While international, regional, and domestic legal systems have 
focused their efforts on developing the specific content of civil and 
political rights, they spent much less interest and energy on 
economic and social rights.  The work of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has demonstrated, however, 
that it is possible to tease out concrete standards relating to these 
kinds of rights.
 
245
 
 244. Id. at ¶ 8(a)–(g). 
  The detailed “factors” analysis in General 
 245. Thanks to the efforts of many scholars and jurists, the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic and Social Rights (1997) and the Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR (1986) also present precise, 
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Comment 4 make it a promising source of assistance to domestic 
constitutional courts looking for judicially manageable standards to 
use in adjudicating economic and social rights, whether statutory 
or constitutional.246
3. Social and Economic Rights in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (“CRC”) 
  For example, domestic courts looking to 
interpret the word “adequate” within the McKinney-Vento Act’s 
definition of homelessness should look to General Comment 4 as a 
source of persuasive authority. 
The primary international instrument relating to children’s 
rights generally is the CRC, which was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in November of 1989 and entered into 
force in September of the following year.247  The CRC is one of the 
most holistic and comprehensive human rights instruments in 
existence; it protects the civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights of children.248  The CRC is also the most widely 
ratified human rights treaty; only the United States and Somalia 
have failed to ratify the Children’s Convention.  In her treatise on 
the CRC, Geraldine Van Bueren argues that the Children’s 
Convention is “a major stepping stone in international law” that 
can be a powerful source of momentum for the improvement of 
children’s welfare around the globe.249
One of the central principles of the CRC is that “the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration” in all actions concerning 
  The economic and social 
rights contained in the CRC are the most relevant to the issue of 
child poverty.  These will therefore be highlighted in this section’s 
overview of the Children’s Convention. 
 
specific, and attainable measures for the economic and social rights sphere.  See 
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
January 1997, Maastricht, Netherlands, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html; The Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, June 1986, University of Limburg, Maastricht, Netherlands, 
http://shr.aaas.org/thesaurus/instrument.php?insid=94. 
 246. See generally General Comment No. 4, supra note 243. 
 247. See CRC, supra note 66. 
 248. Thomas Hammarberg, Children, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 353, 358 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas, eds., 
2d ed. 2001). 
 249. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD 321 (1995). 
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them, whether undertaken by public or private bodies.250  When 
drafting government policies, this principle seems to require the 
eradication of poverty among children to the extent feasible.  
Article 4 of the CRC requires as much, obliging that “[w]ith regard 
to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall 
undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available 
resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international co-operation.”251  Article 6.2 of the right to life 
provision of the CRC adds that “States Parties shall ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the 
child.”252
The next Article that states obligations with respect to child 
welfare issues is Article 18, which requires State Parties to provide 
“appropriate assistance” to parents and guardians in fulfilling their 
child-rearing responsibilities.
  The CRC thus places a high burden upon states with the 
economic potential to alleviate poverty completely among its 
children. 
253  Article 18.2 says that states “shall 
ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for 
the care of children.”254  The article concludes with a duty for State 
Parties to take appropriate measures to ensure that children of 
working parents have the right to benefit from childcare services 
and facilities “for which they are eligible,” with the terms of 
eligibility being left to the discretion of the state.255
Articles 24 through 32 also focus on children’s economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  Article 24 relates to the right to 
health.
 
256  State Parties must “recognize the right of the child to 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to 
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”257  
State Parties must also “strive to ensure that no child is deprived of 
his or her right of access to such healthcare services.”258
 
 250. See CRC, supra note 66, at art. 3.1 (emphasis added).  Like most of the 
international human rights instruments, the CRC is relatively weak in terms of its 
enforcement powers.  There is a Children’s Committee though, to which State 
Parties submit reports every five years and appear before to discuss the progress of 
implementation of the CRC in their domestic jurisdiction.  Id. at art. 44. 
 251. Id. at art. 4. 
 252. Id. at art. 6.2. 
 253. Id. at art. 18.2. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at art. 18.3. 
 256. See id. at art. 24. 
 257. Id. at art. 24.1. 
 258. Id. 
  It requires 
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State Parties to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance 
and healthcare and obliges them to combat disease and 
malnutrition.259
The CRC recognizes that every child has “the right to benefit 
from social security, including social insurance,”
 
260 and obliges 
State Parties to “take the necessary measures to achieve the full 
realization of this right in accordance with their national law.”261  
The Convention also enshrines a right of every child to a standard 
of living adequate not only for the child’s basic survival, but also 
“for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development.”262  Within their means, the CRC dictates that State 
Parties shall take measures to assist parents in realizing this right 
for their children and shall “in case of need provide material 
assistance and support program[s], particularly with regard to 
nutrition, clothing and housing.”263  A child’s right to education is 
also strongly emphasized within the Convention,264 as is the right to 
enjoy one’s own culture, religion, and language.265  The 
importance of play and leisure to children’s quality of life and 
development is also stressed, as is the right to be protected against 
economic exploitation and hazardous work.266
Domestic social justice work on issues like education, poverty, 
and juvenile justice in the United States would benefit from 
integrating the norms enshrined in the CRC into a rights-based 
approach to organizing.  Given the immense physical, 
psychological, and developmental consequences that result from 
homelessness, it is clear that even under a narrow reading of the 
CRC, a State Party with incidence of child poverty and 
homelessness as high as that in the United States and with the 
available resources of the United States, would be in violation of 
the CRC.  Given the resonance of the language of human rights 
with the American public,
 
267
 
 259. Id. at art. 24.2(b)–(c). 
 260. Id. at art. 26.1. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at art. 27.1. 
 263. Id. at art. 27.3. 
 264. Id. at arts. 28–29. 
 265. Id. at art. 30. 
 266. Id. at arts. 31–32. 
 267. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 reframing these problems as human 
rights violations might be helpful in domestic lobbying and 
mobilizing.  Human rights and child welfare groups should also 
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increase efforts to persuade the United States Senate to ratify the 
CRC.  In the meantime, lawyers and advocates should rely upon its 
norms,268 arguing that the CRC is customary international law and 
strong persuasive authority on the minimum standards of dignity 
and welfare that all children deserve.269
V. PROMOTING A CHILD’S RIGHT TO SHELTER WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to 
the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we 
provide enough for those who have too little.270
In this final section, I suggest several avenues for cultivating a 
child’s right to shelter within United States domestic law.  In the 
short term, pursuing a right to shelter under state law is a more 
promising route, but a concurrent long-term approach under 
federal law is also crucial.  My preference for state courts in the 
short term is based upon several factors.  First, it is in part 
motivated by the relative hostility of federal courts towards 
progressive understandings of rights under federal law.  It has been 
nearly forty years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dandridge 
v. Williams, which declined to find a right to welfare in the United 
States Constitution,
 
–Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1937) 
 
271 and Lindsey v. Normet, which declined to 
uphold a federal constitutional right to housing.272
 
 268. Many American scholars are advocating for United States ratification and 
for the use of the CRC’s norms in domestic work.  See, e.g., Roger J.R. Levesque, 
The Internationalization of Children’s Human Rights: Too Radical for American 
Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 237, 243 (1994) (arguing that the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child can provide a basis for transforming 
adolescents’ rights in the United States). 
 269. Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, “Let Them Starve”: Government’s 
Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607, 1639–40 (1995). 
 270. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, U.S. President, Second Inaugural Address 
(Jan. 20, 1937), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos2.asp. 
 271. 397 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1970). 
 272. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). 
  Unfortunately, 
contemporary federal constitutional doctrine does not appear to 
present any better of a climate for revisiting the issue under the 
Federal Constitution.  Justice Brennan, undoubtedly distressed by 
the many dissenting opinions he participated in during that 
decade, advocated in a 1977 law review article for protecting 
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individual rights through state constitutions.273
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their 
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution.  
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, 
their protections often extending beyond those required 
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.  The 
legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore 
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective 
force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our 
liberties cannot be guaranteed.
  Brennan wrote: 
274
While Brennan advocated for the use of state law to protect 
personal liberties generally, several other scholars have suggested 
state constitutional law as a promising avenue for pursuing positive 
social welfare rights specifically,
   
275 including the right to shelter.276  
Helen Hershkoff has argued that both state courts and state 
legislatures277 have important roles to play in advancing norms of 
social welfare rights.278  Hershkoff asserts that state courts need not 
rely upon federal rationality review when considering state laws in 
this area because that standard is based on a number of 
institutional concerns that do not apply in the same way in the state 
context.279
Federal rationality review rests on doubts concerning 
democratic legitimacy, federalism, and separation of 
powers that are inapposite to how state common law 
courts should function under state constitutions that 
guarantee public assistance to the poor.  When a state 
constitution creates a right to a government-provided 
  Arguing that reliance upon the federal rationality test is 
“misplaced,” Hershkoff suggests a different standard of review: 
 
 273. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 274. Id. at 491. 
 275. Daan Braveman, Symposium, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 
EMORY L.J. 577, 614 (1989); James K. Langdon & Mark A. Kass, Homelessness in 
America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 305 (1985). 
 276. Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s Bowl: A Call to Affirm a Positive Right to 
Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions to Satisfy International 
Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421 (2004); Norma Rotunno, Note, 
State Constitutional Social Welfare Provisions and the Right to Housing, 1 HOFSTRA L. & 
POL’Y SYMP. 111, 123–24 (1996) (arguing that state constitutions should contain a 
provision explicitly addressing the needs of the poor and homeless). 
 277. See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 278. See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The 
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999). 
 279. Id. at 1137. 
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social service, the relevant judicial question should be 
whether a challenged law achieves, or is at least likely to 
achieve, the constitutionally prescribed end, and not, as 
federal rationality review would have it, whether the law is 
within the bounds of state legislative power.280
Strengthening the concept of a child’s right to shelter within 
state constitutional law may be one of the most promising methods 
because of the expertise of state institutions that stems from the 
fact that child welfare and housing issues primarily fall within the 
domain of state law.  This speaks to the concern about judicial 
competence, as well as federalism concerns about encroachment 
into areas that are traditionally occupied by the state.  Next, as 
Sarah Ramsey and Daan Braveman point out, the common law 
tradition of state court judges means they are more accustomed to 
relying upon public policy arguments than are federal judges.
 
281
State law is also a more promising venue for the development 
of a child’s right to shelter because many state constitutions already 
demonstrate elements of a social citizenship model.  Many already 
have healthy constitutional norms relating to social welfare rights; 
at least twenty-five state constitutions contain provisions that 
address aid to the poor or the protection of the public’s health or 
welfare.
  
This may be of assistance to those advancing public policy 
arguments based on the persuasive interests in housed, healthy, 
and educated children. 
282
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 269, at 1631–32. 
 
 282. NLCHP, HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 10, at 44 n.247.  The 
National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty’s Report on Homeless in the United 
States and the Human Right to Housing lists the following twenty-five states with such 
constitutional provisions: 
• Alabama – stating that “[i]t [is] the duty of the legislature to require the 
several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the 
maintenance of the poor.” ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; 
• Alaska – enumerating that “the legislature shall provide for public welfare.”  
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 5; 
• California – authorizing the legislature to enact laws relating to relief 
administration.  CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 11; 
• Colorado – requiring the provision of a pension to Colorado residents—
and United States citizens—over the age of sixty, subject to other 
requirements determined by the legislature.  COLO. CONST. art. XXIV, § 3; 
• Delaware – stating that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a State Board of Health which shall have 
supervision of all matters relating to public health.”  DEL. CONST. art. XII,   
§ 1 (repealed 1995); 
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• Georgia – authorizing local governments to contract with public entities for 
the care of its indigent sick.  GA. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 1; 
• Hawaii – reaffirming a belief in government with “an understanding and 
compassionate heart toward all the peoples of the earth.”  HAW. CONST. 
pmbl.; 
• Idaho – providing that the State must establish and support “education, 
reformatory, and penal institutions,” to provide for the “public good” of 
the “insane, deaf and dumb.”  IDAHO CONST. art. X, § 1; 
• Illinois – stating that the State Constitution is ordained and established 
among other reasons to “eliminate poverty and inequality; assure legal, 
social and economic justice; [and] provide opportunity for the fullest 
development of the individual.”  ILL. CONST. pmbl.; 
• Indiana – authorizing county boards to establish farms to house those who 
“have claims upon the . . . aid of society.”  IND. CONST. art. IX, § 3; 
• Kansas – establishing that “[t]he . . . counties of the state shall provide, as 
may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, 
infirmity or other misfortune, may have claims upon the aid of society.”  
KAN. CONST. art. VII, § 4; 
• Louisiana – authorizing the legislature to establish welfare and 
unemployment compensation as well as public health measures.  LA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 8; 
• Michigan – stating that “[t]he legislature shall pass suitable laws for the 
protection and promotion of public health.”  MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51; 
• Mississippi – authorizing the legislature to provide homes to those who 
have claims upon the aid of society.  MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 262; 
• Missouri – stating that the general assembly shall establish a department of 
public health and welfare.  MO. CONST. art. IV, § 37; 
• Nevada – stating that “[i]nstitutions for the benefit of the Insane, Blind and 
Deaf and Dumb, and such other benevolent institutions as the public good 
may require, shall be fostered and supported by the State, subject to such 
regulations as may be prescribed by law.”  N.V. CONST. art. 13, § 1; 
• New Mexico – authorizing state and local governments to make provisions 
relating to the care of sick and indigent persons.  N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14; 
• New York – stating that “[t]he aid, care and support of the needy . . . shall 
be provided by the State . . . .”  N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; 
• North Carolina – establishing that a “[b]eneficent provision for the poor, 
the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and 
Christian state.  Therefore the General Assembly shall provide for and 
define the duties of a board of public welfare.”  N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; 
• Oklahoma – stating that “[t]he several counties of the State shall provide, 
as may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, 
infirmity, or misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of the 
county.”  OKLA. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; 
• Rhode Island – providing that “[a]ll free governments are instituted for the 
protection, safety, and happiness of the people.  All laws, therefore, should 
be made for the good of the whole; and the burdens of the state ought to 
be fairly distributed among its citizens.”  R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; 
• South Carolina – stating that “[t]he health, welfare, and safety of the lives 
and property of the people of this State and the conservation of its natural 
resources are matters of public concern.”  S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1; 
• Texas – authorizing payment of assistance to needy.  TEX. CONST. art. III, § 
51a; 
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Ramsey and Braveman classify state constitutional law language 
relating to the care of the needy or the protection of the health of 
its residents into three categories: 1) those that make a statement of 
principle about social welfare; 2) those that authorize the state or a 
local entity to provide for the poor; and 3) those that “do not 
explicitly authorize assistance, but instead make reference to a 
governmental duty to care for the [poor].”283  The first approach 
involves state constitutional language and makes a statement of 
principle about the care of the less fortunate, most frequently 
found in a constitution’s preamble.284
New York, whose constitution falls into the first category, is a 
pioneer in the area of state constitutional protections for the right 
to shelter.  Article 17 of the New York Constitution, which 
mandates that “the aid, care and support of the needy are public 
concerns and shall be provided by the state,” has been read to 
create a right to housing, which at the minimum, requires the 
provision of emergency shelter for the homeless.
   
285  In 1981, New 
York City and the state of New York entered into a consent decree 
in the case of Callahan v. Carey.286  The decree guaranteed a right to 
shelter for all homeless men in New York City and established 
minimum health and safety standards for homeless shelters.287  In 
1983, Eldredge v. Koch extended this right to shelter and for equal 
shelter standards to homeless women in New York City.288
 
• West Virginia – stating that “[c]oroners, overseers of the poor and 
surveyors of roads shall be appointed by the county court.”  W.V. CONST. 
art. IX, § 2; and 
  In 1986, 
McCain v. Koch extended the right to shelter to families with 
• Wyoming – setting forth a duty of the legislature to provide for “the health 
and morality of the people.”  WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 20. 
Until 1988, Montana also had such a provision.  MONT. CONST art. XII, § 3(3) 
(establishing that “[t]he legislature shall provide such economic assistance and 
social and rehabilitative services . . . for those . . . who . . . may have need for the 
aid of society”) (emphasis added).  Montana now authorizes but does not require 
aid to the poor.  See MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (“The legislature may provide 
such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by 
reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in 
need.”). 
 283. Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 269, at 1623–24. 
 284. See id. at 1623. 
 285. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. 
 286. No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 1981) (final judgment by consent), 
available at http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/callahan 
consentdecree.pdf. 
 287. Id.   
 288. 469 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
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children.289  Both Hawaii and Illinois are also examples of this 
model.290  Advocates in states whose constitutions contain 
statements of principle about care may benefit from looking to the 
jurisprudence not only of New York but also of countries like India 
and Ireland, whose constitutions are discussed in Part II of this 
article.291
Oklahoma’s constitution takes the second approach—
authorizing the state or a local entity to provide for the poor or the 
health of the state citizens.
 
292  North Carolina and Alabama are 
examples of the third approach since both constitutions affirm a 
governmental duty to care for the poor.293
No pattern has yet emerged between the ways in which 
constitutions recognize social welfare issues and state constitutional 
jurisprudence on social welfare rights.  This suggests that a 
particularized approach will be the most fruitful, whereby creative 
lawyers tailor their arguments to state courts based upon any 
constitutional provisions and any relevant state traditions and 
customs.
 
294  Even though no other state appears to have articulated 
a right to shelter under state constitutional law at this time, the 
New York case is a reason for optimism295
State legislatures should also be educated and lobbied on the 
topic so that they might also recognize a state right to shelter for 
children.  Hershkoff argues that state constitutional amendments, 
which are much easier to accomplish and therefore happen much 
more frequently than do amendments to the Federal Constitution, 
“create important occasions for public dialogue, value formation, 
and social reform.”
 and provides an example 
that demonstrates the workability of a right to shelter within state 
law. 
296
 
 289. 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).  For a detailed timeline of the 
right to housing under the New York Constitution, see COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
THE RIGHT TO SHELTER FOR HOMELESS NEW YORKERS: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING 
(2002), http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/righttoshelter 
timeline.pdf. 
 290. See HAW. CONST. pmbl.; ILL. CONST. pmbl. 
 291. See supra notes 96–97 (referencing the Constitutions of India and 
Ireland). 
 292. OKLA. CONST. art. XXV, § 1. 
 293. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
 294. Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 269, at 1629–31. 
 295. See supra notes 285–89 and accompanying text. 
 296. Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State 
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 803–05 (2002). 
  It may be time for progressives to seriously 
58
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/3
  
2009] JUSTICE FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN 933 
consider using constitutional amendments to bolster the basic 
welfare rights of children. 
Relying primarily upon state law, however, may leave behind 
poor and homeless children in states where legislators are 
unwilling to pass new laws and courts are unwilling to entertain 
new legal theories.  It is therefore also important for progressive 
lawyers and advocates of a right to housing to pay some attention to 
creating respect for a right to shelter under federal law.  
Ratification and implementation of the norms enshrined in the 
ICESCR is one possible project within the federal system.  Barbara 
Stark has proposed an integrated state and federal model for the 
protection of the economic and social rights enshrined in the 
Covenant.297  Upon ratification of the ICESCR, the “Covenant 
would become directly binding upon the states” as well as the 
federal government.298  Stark proposes that federal law could create 
a floor to welfare rights, whereby federal courts would articulate a 
minimal standard below which a state could not fall without 
jeopardizing national compliance with the ICESCR, as well as 
handling federal constitutional claims as necessary.299  As Stark 
notes, state courts would have the option to articulate higher 
standards, reflecting local needs and resources, in the same way 
that states are free to interpret the “equal protection” provisions of 
their own constitutions to require more than the same language in 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution.300  Stark 
argues that the leeway built into the ICESCR to accommodate the 
demands of cultural relativism in an international context would 
serve equally well in the United States in creating flexibility for 
state-specific tailoring.301
Enforcement and implementation of the McKinney-Vento 
Homeless Education Assistance Improvements Act of 2001
 
302
 
 297. Stark, supra note 46, at 103–28. 
 298. Id. at 106–07. 
 299. Id. at 107–09. 
 300. Id. at 109. 
 301. Id. at 109–10. 
 302. 42 U.S.C. § 11431–35 (Supp. V 2005). 
 is 
another realm of federal law in which conversations about a right 
to shelter should be developed.  Even though the statute is framed 
entirely around the educational rights of homeless children and 
does not appear to question or address the fact that they are 
homeless, it is a public recognition both of the crisis that exists with 
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unsheltered children as well as the strong correlations between 
homelessness and educational underachievement.  This creates a 
crucial window for discourse about these interconnections and the 
need to eliminate not only educational hurdles, but also the 
experience of homelessness in these children’s lives.  Advocates 
must strive to ensure that a rights-based approach is utilized with 
activism around the McKinney-Vento Act.  The holistic approach of 
the CRC provides a helpful model for conceptualizing the ways that 
the right to housing and the right to education intersect. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In August of 2004, the first National Homeless Kids 
Convention was held at the City University of New York Graduate 
Center in New York City.303  Homeless children and their families 
from across the country attended the convention to address “the 
growing social problem of homelessness.”304
There is much work to be done in cultivating a child’s right to 
shelter.  State-by-state analyses should be developed in order to 
inform strategies for expanding state constitutional rights.  
Networks of lawyers and policymakers should be expanded and 
new connections built.  We must challenge many misconceptions 
 
As these young delegates know all too well, the needs of 
children who are homeless or at risk of becoming homeless are 
tremendous.  And as the young convention delegates identified, 
homelessness and poverty are complicated problems that intersect 
with economic, social, political, legal, and cultural realities and 
norms.  There is no easy or quick fix for transforming our society 
into one that meets the basic needs of all its inhabitants.  
Reframing these unmet needs, however, as unfulfilled rights and in 
extreme cases, human rights violations, is an important step toward 
this end.  Cultivating a rights-based approach to child homelessness 
in the United States will be a gradual process, one that requires 
openness to international and comparative law—not as something 
that coerces and constrains—but that informs and inspires.   
 
 303. See COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, SAFETY NET 6 (Summer 2005), 
http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/safetynetsummer2005.pdf  
(referencing how on June 18, 2005 and “for the “second year in a row,” “the youth 
advocacy project of Coalition for the Homeless, hosted the Homeless Youth 
Summit”). 
 304. Id. 
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about a variety of rights, reconstructing and imagining anew the 
content of such rights.  Forgotten histories of our Second Bill of 
Rights and grassroots welfare rights organizing must be retold.  
Human rights education will also play a critical role, and accessible 
materials that address the international human right to shelter and 
welfare rights traditions in the United States need to be developed 
to that end.  As challenging and multifaceted as the project will be, 
there are many reasons to be optimistic.  Those who desire to 
advance social welfare can draw support from a significant body of 
legal tradition, both domestic and international, to inform their 
efforts.  Protecting the dignity and humanity of children by 
ensuring their right to shelter will bring invaluable rewards, both to 
those young people who are finally able to secure a safe and stable 
home and to society as a whole. 
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